

1. I am proud when

1. I have some quality that I regard as excellent and reflecting well on me, and either (a) want other people to know about it, on the basis that they share my view of its excellence, or at least (b) consider that the excellence in question is the sort of thing that normally enhances or should enhance esteem
2. a group or individual with whom I identify demonstrates some excellence that reflects in some way on me
3. I am reluctant to do something that I regard as humiliating but which seems (to me or to others) to be desirable or necessary
4. my attachment to my own self-esteem is such that I resent and react to what I take to be slights on the part of others
5. I have an exaggerated sense of my worth and capabilities, one that is liable to lead me into error, in a way that others find distasteful, because – at least in some cases – they regard it as encroaching upon their claims

2. D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks* (Toronto, 2006) 90:

It may be that, in the fiercely competitive world of the classical Greek city state, gestures intended to augment the reputation of another ... were so rare that there was no need to give a special name to the response that they elicited.

Ibid. 100:

Classical Greek ... seems to lack a basic emotion term corresponding to a positive sense of pride, though the negative sentiment of arrogance is well attested ... [P]erhaps one factor is that in the competitive world of Greek city-state society, people were more likely to be struggling to preserve their status under the critical gaze of their fellow citizens than to be basking in their admiration ... They were concerned to protect their reputations, not to make others feel good about themselves. Praise was easily read as flattery. The pride the ancients meditated on was that which goes before a fall.

3. Aristotle on honour (*timê*):

Honour [i.e. the esteem one receives from others] is the goal of civic [community?] life (Arist. *EN* 1.5, 1095b23).

People seek honour in order to convince themselves that they are good (*EN* 1.5, 1095b26–28; cf. 4.3, 1123b35, 8.14, 1163b3–4)

To be admired is pleasant, on account of the very fact of being honoured (*Rhet.* 1.11, 1371a21–2)

Being loved seems to be akin to being honoured, and this is what most people aim at. But it seems to be not for its own sake that people choose honour, but incidentally. For most people enjoy being honoured by those in positions of authority because of their hopes (for they think that if they want anything they will get it from them; and therefore they delight in honour as a token of favour to come); while **those who desire honour from good men, and men who know, are aiming at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they delight in honour, therefore, because they believe in their own goodness on the strength of the judgement of those who speak about them** (*EN* 8.8, 1159a12–27).

4. *Megalopsychia*, Aristotle, *EN*. 4.3:

The *megalopsychos* both is and thinks himself worthy of great things (*EN* 4.3, 1123b2), especially of the greatest of external goods, namely honour (*timê*, 1123b17–24, 1124a17–19).

He deserves *timê* precisely because he possesses the excellences to which it pays tribute (1123b26–1124a4).

Timê is what *megalopsychia* is all about (1124a4–5, 13).

The *megalopsychos* knows his worth and feels pleasure when his greatest achievements are recognized by serious people, on the basis that he is getting more or less what he deserves (1124a5–7).

The *megalopsychos* likes to confer benefits, but is ashamed to be their recipient (1124b9–10).

He performs services freely, but is reluctant to ask for help (1124b17–18).

It's not ignoble to put on airs [*semnynesthai*] with regard to the [well-regarded], but vulgar in the case of the humble (*hoi tapeinoi*, 1124b18–22).

Cf. 1123b23–6, on the prizes for which the *megalopsychos* refuses to compete.

5. Ordinary varieties of positive pride:

On the other side, the strong-greaved Achaians
led Aias, happy in his victory, to great Agamemnon.

Homer, *Iliad* 7. 311–12

Leave her to rejoice in her wealthy origins!

Sophocles, *OT* 1070

For my part, I'd be preening myself (*kallynesthai*) and luxuriating (*habrynesthai*) in it, if I understood these matters ...

Plato, *Apology* 20c

The majority of the Ionians are ashamed to be called Ionian, whereas the twelve cities that founded the Panionium at Mycale positively glory in it (*agallesthai*) (Herodotus 1.143.3).

[The Scythian warrior scalps his opponents, displays the scalps] and glories therein (*agallesthai*), for the one who displays the most scalps is adjudged to be the best man

Herodotus 4.64.2

(Cf. the Libyan women whose anklets show how many men they've slept with – the one who has the most is considered best, in so far as she is loved by the most men, 4.176)

The mother of Cleobis and Biton is 'overjoyed [*pericharês*] at their deed and the fame that it had brought them' (1.31.4).

So I spoke, and the ghost of swift-footed Aeacides [i.e. Achilles] went with long strides across the meadow of asphodel, rejoicing that I had said that his son was famous.

Homer, *Odyssey* 11.538–40

Demaratus (Herodotus 7.102):

I admire all the Greeks who live in those Dorian lands, but I shall restrict what I have to say to the Spartans alone. They will never listen to any proposals of yours that will bring slavery on Greece ...

Xerxes (7.103):

But if your boast is so great [*auchein*], make sure that this boast [*kompos*] of yours is not uttered in vain ...

6. *Philotimia*

Periander's daughter to her brother, Lycophron, who is refusing to reconcile with their father:

'Come home; stop punishing yourself. Love of honour [*philotimia*] is a stupid thing; don't fight wrong with wrong.'

Herodotus 3.53.4

7. *Semnotês* (< *sebein*, to respect, *sebas*, reverence/majesty)

Clyt. I won't let shame (*aidôs*) stop me falling to your knees, a mortal before a man born from a goddess; why should I put on airs [*semnynesthai*]? On whose behalf should I strive if not my child's?

Clyt. Do you wish her to clasp your knees as a suppliant? That would be unmaidenly; yet if it is your resolve, come she shall, bearing herself modestly; but if I can obtain the same outcome from you without her coming then let her stay indoors, for the focus of her self-respect is genuinely worth respecting (*σεμνὰ γὰρ σεμνύεται*).

Iph. Open the door, men, and let me hide!

Clyt. Why do you run away, my child?
 Iph. I can see Achilles here, and I'm ashamed [*aischynesthai*].
 Clyt. But why?
 Iph. The failure of our marriage brings me shame [*aidôs*]
 Clyt. The way things have turned out in your case does not allow for delicacy [*habrotês*]. Stay: there's no room for *semnotês* – what we need is help.

Euripides, *IA* 900–2, 992–6, 1340–4

Servant: Would you take a piece of good advice from me?
 Hippolytus: Most certainly. Otherwise I would not seem wise. 90
 Servant: The rule observed by mortals—do you know it?
 Hippolytus: No. What is the law you question me about?
 Servant: To hate what's **haughty** [*semnos*] and not friend to all.
 Hippolytus: And rightly. Who that's **haughty** [*semnos*] gives no pain?
 Servant: And is there charm in affability? 95
 Hippolytus: Yes, much, and profit too with little toil.
 Servant: Do you think the same is true among the gods?
 Hippolytus: Yes, if we humans follow heavenly usage.
 Servant: How then no word for a **high and mighty** [*semnos*] goddess?
 Hippolytus: Which? Careful lest your tongue commit some slip. 100
 Servant: The goddess here, who stands beside your gate.
 Hippolytus: I greet her from afar, for I am pure.
 Servant: Yet she's **revered** [*semnos*] and famous among mortals.
 Hippolytus: I do not like a god worshipped at night.
 Servant: My son, to honour the gods is only just. 105
 Hippolytus: Men have their likes, in gods and men alike.
 Servant: I wish you good fortune—and the good sense you need!

Euripides, *Hippolytus* 89–107

8. *Hybris*

But those who without virtue have such goods are neither justified in making great claims nor entitled to the name of *megalopsychos* ... Rather, they become supercilious and hybristic. For without virtue it is not easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune; and, being unable to bear them, and thinking themselves superior to others, they despise others and do what they please. They imitate the *megalopsychos* without being like him, as far as they can; so they do not act virtuously, but they do despise others. For the *megalopsychos* despises justly (since he thinks truly), but the many do so at random.

Aristotle, *EN* 4.3, 1124a29–1124b6

Hybris is doing or saying things whereby the sufferer incurs disgrace [*aischynê*], not to obtain any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act, but for one's own pleasure ... The cause of the pleasure in those who commit *hybris* is the idea that, in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing their own superiority. That is why the young and the rich are given to *hybris*; for they think that, in committing *hybris*, they are showing their superiority. Dishonour [*atimia*] is characteristic of *hybris*; and one who dishonours slights; for that which is worthless has no honour [*timê*], either as good or bad.

Arist. *Rhet.* 2.2, 1378b23–31

Hybristic dispositions inhibit fear (*Rhet.* 2.3, 1382b33–1383a3):

It is therefore necessary that fear should affect those who think that something might happen to them, and they should be afraid of the persons at whose hands they expect to suffer, and of certain things, and at certain times. Those who either are or seem to be enjoying great good fortune do not think anything can happen to them; that is why they are *hybristai*, contemptuous, and brazen, and what makes them such is wealth, strength, having a lot of friends, power.

inhibit pity (2.8, 1385b19–21, 29–31):

This is why those who are utterly ruined are incapable of pity, for they think that nothing more can happen them (since it has already happened); similarly those who think themselves supremely fortunate: they, rather, are prone to *hybris*.

... and [those who feel pity include] those who are not influenced by any courageous emotion, such as anger or confidence (for these emotions do not take account of the future), and those who are not in a hybristic condition [*diathesis*] (for these people do not reckon that anything will happen to them).

The young (Rhet. 2.12, 1389a2–b12, esp. b7–12):

Their wrongdoing is due to *hybris*, not to wickedness. And they are inclined to pity, because they think everyone is virtuous and better than they are (for they measure their neighbours by their own lack of malice, so that they suppose that they suffer undeservedly); and they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty too; for wit is educated *hybris*.

The rich (Rhet. 1390b32–1391a2):

The characters which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are *hybristai* and arrogant, being affected by the acquisition of wealth (for they are so disposed as to think that they possess all good things; and wealth is a kind of standard of value of everything else, so that everything seems purchasable by it).

Hence (1391a13–14) ‘the character that belongs to wealth is that of a lucky fool’.

Those who enjoy some advantage/eutychêma (Pol. 4.2, 1295b6–11):

For a person who is exceedingly beautiful or strong or nobly born or rich, or the opposite – i.e. exceedingly poor or weak or of very mean station – it is difficult to follow reason; for the former tend rather to become *hybristai* and large-scale villains, while the latter tend too much to petty crime and low-level villainy, and the motive of all wrongdoing is either *hybris* or malice.

Cf. *Pol.* 7.1, 1334a25–8:

War compels people to be just and moderate, whereas the enjoyment of prosperity and the leisure of peacetime tend to make them *hybristai*.

9. Darius’ Ghost on Persian *hybris*:

They are now lingering where the plain is watered by the stream of Asopus which nourishes Boeotia’s fields. Here they will meet their crowning disaster in requital for their *hybris* and godless thoughts [*phronêmata*]. For, on reaching the land of Hellas, [810] restrained by no *aidôs* [*honour, shame, respect*], they ravaged the images of the gods and set fire to their temples. Altars have been destroyed, statues of the gods have been thrown from their bases in utter ruin and confusion. Therefore, since they wrought such evil, evil they suffer in no less measure; and other evils are still in store: [815] the spring of their woes is not yet quenched, but it still wells forth. For so great will be the mass of clotted gore spilled by the Dorian lance upon Plataean soil that heaps of dead will reveal, even to the third generation, a voiceless record for the eyes of men [820] that mortal man should not think excessive thoughts [*hyperpheu ... phronein*]. For *hybris bursts out in bloom* [*exanthein*] and bears as its fruit a crop of calamity [*atê*], from which it reaps an abundant harvest of tears.

Know that such are the penalties for deeds like these, and remember Athens and Greece. Let no one of you, [825] through disdain of present fortune and lust for more, squander abundant wealth. Zeus, in truth, is a chastiser of over-boastful thoughts [*phronêmata*], a hard assessor. Therefore, now that my son has been warned to be prudent by the voice of God, [830] instruct him with admonitions of reason to cease from drawing the punishment of Heaven on himself by his over-boastful boldness.

Aeschylus, *Persians* 805–31

10. *Hybris* in plants:

Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* 725b35–6 (vines which *exhybrizein* because of over-feeding).

Cf. Theophrastus, *History of Plants* 2.7.6 (various remedies when trees sprouts lots of buds but do not bear fruit = ‘what some call curbing the tree’s *hybris*’); *Causes of Plants* 2.16.8 (‘when almond trees are planted in deep and rich soil they tend to *exhybrizein* and fail to fruit because of excessive nutrition’; ditto 3.6.8; cf. silphium at 3.1.5; hybridic fruit trees in general at 3. 15. 4 (produce leaves, buds, and stems, but not fruit)).

11. *Hybris* in animals:

Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 7.5.62–3 (horses which are *hybristai* cease to bite and to *hybrizein* once castrated; similarly bulls cease to *mega phronein* and *apeithein*, and dogs to desert their masters).

Hybris in bulls, Euripides, *Bacchae* 743–4.

‘Erect *hybris*’ of ithyphallic donkeys, Pindar, *Pythian* 10.34–6 (cf. Herodotus 4.129, Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1306, 1310).

12. The ‘Archaic chain’ of *koros*, *hybris*, and *atê* – e.g. Solon fr. 4.34–5:

[Rule of Law] smooths the rough, stops satiety [*koros*], dims *hybris*, and withers the flowers of *atê* as they sprout.

Cf. genealogical metaphors:

Koros begets *Hybris*: Solon fr. 6.3–4, Theognis 153–4; *Hybris* begets *Koros*: Pindar *Olympian* 13.9–10.

Cf. Euripides, fragments 437–8 : good fortune/wealth = the parent of *hybris*.

13. Back to *Persians*

Youthful impetuosity: 73–4, 353, 718, 744, 754, 782

Abundant wealth: 3, 9, 45, 53, 79–80, 159, 163–8, 250, 252, 751, 754–6

Scorning present fortune (824–6):

Darius: Let no one of you, through disdain of present fortune and lust for more, squander abundant wealth.

Cf. Darius at 725, 739–42, plus the chorus (94–115, 158, 515–16, 921), the Queen (161–4, 472–7, 724), the Messenger (345–7, 353–4, 362, 373, 454–5), and Xerxes himself (909–12, 942–3)

Cf. the Queen at 601–2:

When fortune flows with prosperous tide, they believe that this same fortune will forever bring them success.

Divine jealousy (*phthonos*): 282–3, 345–7, 353–4, 362, 454–5, 472, 513–16, 845–6, 909–12, 921, 942–3, 1005–7

Divine intervention (723–5, 742):

Darius: What! Did he succeed in closing the mighty Bosphorus?

Queen: Yes indeed. One of the divine powers must have assisted him in his purpose.

Darius: Alas! Some mighty power came upon him so that he was not able to think clearly.

Darius: When a man hastens to his own undoing, the god lends him a hand.

14. The principle of alternation:

‘For thus have the gods spun the thread for wretched mortals, that they should live in pain; but they themselves are without care. For there are two jars placed on the floor of Zeus of gifts that he gives, the one of ills, the other of blessings. If Zeus who delights in the thunderbolt gives a man a mixed lot, that man meets now with evil, now with good; but if he gives only from the evils, he ruins a man, and evil hunger drives him over the divine earth, and he wanders honoured by neither gods nor mortals.’

Achilles to Priam, *Iliad* 24.525–33

15. Herodotus’ Croesus narrative:

Croesus was angry and said, ‘My Athenian guest, do you so despise our happiness that you do not even make us worth as much as common men?’ Solon replied, ‘Croesus, you ask me about human affairs, and I know that the divine is entirely grudging [*phthoneros*] and

troublesome to us ... man is entirely chance. To me you seem to be very rich and to be king of many people, but I cannot answer your question before I learn that you ended your life well ... If besides all this he ends his life well, then he is the one whom you seek, the one worthy to be called fortunate. But refrain from calling him fortunate before he dies; call him lucky ... It is necessary to see how the end of every affair turns out, for the god promises fortune to many people and then utterly ruins them.'

Herodotus 1.32

But after Solon's departure great retribution [*nemesis*] from god befell Croesus, as I guess, because he considered himself to be the most fortunate of all human beings.

Herodotus 1.34.1

16. Persian *hybris* in Herodotus:

Herodotus 7.45–7: Xerxes *counts himself happy*, but then weeps for the brevity of human life and the vulnerability of all human affairs; his uncle, Artabanus, observes that the real cause for sadness is the **prevalence of suffering even in the life of the most fortunate**.

- Xerxes intends to yoke the Hellespont (7.8β1)
- The Persian empire will encompass all the lands on which the sun shines, equalling 'Zeus' heaven' in extent (7.8γ1-2).
- Xerxes'/the Persians' good fortune can only continue – god is guiding Persian destiny for the best, and the Persians have only to follow (7.8α1).
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Artabanus warns (7.10ε):

You see how the god smites with his thunderbolt animals of **excessive size** and does not suffer them to **show off**, while the small do not irritate him at all; and you see how it is always on the tallest buildings and trees that he sends his thunderbolts; for **the god is accustomed to curb all things that stand out**. So a large army is destroyed by a smaller, when the god, **out of jealousy** [*phthonos*] sends fear or the thunderbolt among them, and they perish unworthily; for the god allows none but himself to **think big** [*mega phronein*].

Xerxes' plan 'increased *hybris*' and involved 'always seeking to have something more than what is present' (Artabanus at 7.16α2); it is better to 'keep quiet' rather than to 'desire many things' (Artabanus again at 7.18.2–3).

Cf. the oracle that promises divine retribution for Persian *hybris* at 8.77 .

Themistocles at 8.109.3:

It is not we who have won this victory, but the gods and the heroes, who begrudged [*phthonein*] one man rule over Asia and Europe, and that an unholy man and wicked one who dealt alike with temples and private property, burning and overthrowing the images of the gods – who even lashed the sea and threw fetters into it.

Herodotus endorses divine intervention: e.g. 7.139.5, 8.13, 8.129.3, 9.65.2, 9.100.2

Cf. e.g. 8.37.1–3, where the miraculous appearance of divine weapons before the temple of Apollo at Delphi is followed by a thunderbolt, a landslide, a shout from the temple

Miracles, portents, oracles, and extreme weather events: e.g. 7.34, 7.37.2, 7.188–91, 8.12.1, 8.38–8.39.1, 8.53.1, 8.65.2, 8.65.5–6, 8.77, 8.129.3, 9.61.3–9.62.1, 9.83.2, 9.100.1, 9.120