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HEIDEGGER, ADORNO, AND MIMESIS

ABSTRACT

I discuss the relations between Heidegger and Adorno’s Philosophies of Art by situating them against two shared backgrounds: the first is Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment, the second is the pervasive appearance of mimesis in each of their aesthetic theories. The term mimesis will be employed in regard to Heidegger’s treatment—in his “Origin of the Work of Art”—of the origin and the means by which truth “happens”, specifically when mimesis turns against itself as mere imitation. The movement of the artwork is then considered as follows: the concept of mimesis is examined in light of Heidegger’s “Origin” essay to illuminate the concept and essay by placing both in relation to Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (especially the way mimesis figures there) as well as Kant’s doctrine of the sublime. The movement of the artwork toward truth is presented as the movement of mimesis, in particular, as akin to the sublime’s negation of what has already appeared. For Heidegger and Adorno’s accounts, the mimetic movement of the artwork parallels the movement of aesthetic judgment.

Key words: aesthetics; artwork; identity; mimesis; truth.

THE VEHICLE FOR TRUTH IN THE ARTWORK

“Truth happens in the temple’s standing where it is. This does not mean that something is correctly represented and rendered here, but that what is as a whole is brought into unconcealedness and held therein. ‘To hold’ (halten) originally means to tend, keep, take care (hüten). Truth happens in Van Gogh’s painting. This does not mean that something is correctly portrayed, but rather that in the revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes, that which is as a whole—world and earth in their counterplay—attains to unconcealedness.”

As I understand Heidegger’s formulation, the artwork’s origin lies in a movement against the false movement of portrayal, or depiction, and repetition. Mimesis is the term I would like to employ to describe this same origin and the means by which truth happens: specifically when mimesis turns against itself as simple imitation: “In unconcealedness, as truth, there occurs also the other ‘un’- of a double restraint or refusal. Truth occurs as such in the opposition of clearing and double concealing” (OWA, p. 60). Mimesis becomes the vehicle for truth in the artwork not simply by the setting of something in motion but rather in the becoming motion of “that which is as a whole” that thereby “attains to unconcealedness”. If mimesis were to occur only as imitation, portrayal, or representation, it would remain but a false and falsifying movement. Indeed, an abiding question for aesthetics is whether this fundamentally repetitive gesture (of portrayal, imitation, etc.) ought to count as movement at all. It might better be portrayed as forestalled movement, as the rehearsal or staging of a movement yet to come. What sort of movement is the artwork such that Heidegger calls it the “setting-into-work of truth”? (OWA, p. 71).

To answer this question I will consider here a constellation of terms and relations: first, I will position the concept of mimesis in the light of Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art” essay. I hope to illuminate this concept and Heidegger’s essay by placing them in relation to Adorno’s aesthetics (and the way mimesis figures there2) and with Kant’s doctrine of the sublime. What I hope to accomplish overall is a reading of “Origin of the Work of Art” that displays the

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2 The most comprehensive account of the concept of mimesis for Adorno is to be found in Josef Früchtl’s *Mimesis. Konstellation eines Zentralbegriffs bei Adorno* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann 1986).
movement of the artwork toward truth as the movement of mimesis, though Heidegger himself does not explicitly employ this concept in the essay. Secondly, I want to suggest a parallel between two registers: I want to claim—for both Heidegger and Adorno’s accounts—that the mimetic movement of the artwork parallels the movement of aesthetic judgment, especially in regard to Kant’s doctrine of the sublime—that is, as a denial or disavowal of simple imitation. To formulate this parallel more strongly would be to claim that there is a mimetic relationship between those two realms each of which is itself composed by mimesis. That is, the dynamic judgment of the sublime would be a mimetic appropriation of the mimesis embodied by the artwork.³ Put differently: the artwork is the prefiguration of, and the guide for, the movement of aesthetic judgment.⁴

Let me begin with Adorno and Horkheimer’s citation, in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, of Mauss and Hubert’s evocative description of mimesis in their General Theory of Magic: “L’un est le tout, tout est dans l’un, la nature triomphe de la nature”.⁵ From this short passage two aspects of mimesis can be discerned: the first is in regards to the malleability of identity between the one and the many; the second aspect may be described as the self-overreaching of nature. Let us for the time being focus on the first aspect, and attempt to relate this malleability of identity achieved by mimesis to what I have elsewhere described as the foundational premise of Kant’s aesthetics: what Kant calls objective

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³ Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, in his essay “The Echo of the Subject”, in Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed. Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1989) writes the following in regard to the musical “appearance” of mimesis: “The absence of rhythm, in other words, is equivalent to the infinitely paradoxical appearance of the mimetic itself: the indifferentiable as such, the imperceptible par excellence. The absence of that on the basis of which there is imitation, the absence of the imitated or the repeated (music, which in its very principle is itself repetition) reveals what is by definition unreveable—imitation or repetition. In general, nothing could appear, arise, be revealed, ‘occur’, were it not for repetition. The absence of repetition, by consequence, reveals only the unreveable, gives rise only to the improbable, and throws off the perceived and well-known. Nothing occurs: in effect, the Unheimliche—the most uncanny and most unsettling prodigy . . . rhythm would also be the condition of possibility for the subject” (p. 195).
⁴ My ensuing elaboration of mimesis, especially in regard to Adorno’s aesthetics, has been provoked to a large extent by Wilhelm Wurzer’s quite rich and provocative work in his Filming and Judgment; Between Heidegger and Adorno (London: Humanities Press 1990). But where Wurzer finds in Adorno’s aesthetics a treatment of mimesis as inadequate for reflecting and responding to modern experience, I instead attempt to read mimesis in Adorno as the mechanism by which that inadequacy is exposed and problematized. In short, while I agree with Wurzer in regard to interpreting mimesis in Adorno’s aesthetics as already pointing, in modernist art, beyond itself, I would insist in opposition to Wurzer that mimetic pointing—especially toward the beyond—is fundamentally reflexive. Thus I am tempted, despite Wurzer’s expressed caution, to interpret what he calls “filming” as precisely a mode of imagining the beyond modeled, however, on a reified mechanism of the past—and further, I think this is the true merit of the concept.
Briefly described, objective subreption is the mistaking of object for subject. You’ll recall that in Kant’s aesthetics the actual content, if you will, of the properly aesthetic judgment is the inner harmony of subjective faculties. And yet the success or completion of that judgment occurs only by way of a fundamental misrecognition of that same harmony by the subject. That is, the properly aesthetic judgment occurs in the moment when the subject making the purported judgment misrecognizes its own harmony as something objective; beauty is the name for this harmony misrecognizing itself. Thus the mistake is not simply along the lines of mistaking object for subject but is also the mistaking of a static object for a subjective process. We might thus call the subreption that constitutes aesthetic judgment a double or profound mistake. (With more time I would explain how this beautiful misnaming of subjective harmony also functions as a brake upon the aesthetic movement—and what Schiller calls the play—of the subjective faculties; in short, the judgment of beauty puts a halt to the movement within the subject. The sublime would then of course be construed as the subjective dynamism that forestalls its misrecognition as something static and objective).

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7 Indeed, Jacob Rogozinski goes so far as to claim that for Kant form is movement: “Form, says Kant, is not merely Gestalt; it does not designate the arrested contour of a figure but the movement of its figuration, the tracing of its limit, the unification of its diversity”. “The Gift of the World”, in Of the Sublime: Presence in Question, trans. Jeffrey S. Librett (SUNY Press 1993), p. 135.

8 Another name for the constitutive aesthetic mistakenness is failure: “The sublime measures our failure. If it is a sacred relation to the divine that constitutes the sublime, then our failure will be equivalent to our distance from the sacred, or to our unbelief, our incapacity to navigate through the strains of the difference between immortal and mortal”. Michel Deguy, “The Discourse of Exaltation: Contribution to a Rereading of Pseudo-Longinus”, in Of the Sublime: Presence in Question, op. cit., p. 7. Deguy goes on to write: “The deluge, the sublime, simulates the origin in reproducing it and reproduces it in simulating the origin, the simplicity of the origin, dissimulating still, reserving the diversity of multiplicity, turning itself ‘inside out’ as it hides and ‘makes one forget’ the division . . .” (p. 11).

9 Or, as Jean-Luc Nancy more provocatively puts it: “As is well known, there is no Kantian aesthetics. And there is not, after Kant, any thought of art (or of the beautiful) that does not refuse aesthetics and interpolate in art something other than art: let us say, truth, or experience, the experience of truth or the experience of thought. . . the essential point is precisely that the claim of the sublime forms the exact reverse of the sublation of art” (p. 27). Nancy writes of the movement of the sublime much as I attempt in the present essay to describe that of mimesis: “The sublime is a feeling, and yet, more than a feeling in the banal sense, it is the emotion of the subject at the limit. The subject of the sublime, if there is one, is a subject who is moved. . . . it would be better to say that the feeling of the sublime is hardly an emotion at all but rather the mere motion of presentation—at the limit and syncopated” (p. 44). “The Sublime Offering”, in Of the Sublime: Presence in Question, op. cit.
THE VEHICLE OF THE DESIRE FOR IDENTITY

Mimesis shares with aesthetic judgment a fluidity of identity between the singular and the universal as well as a confusion and constitutive mistakenness regarding subject and object. And in Adorno and Horkheimer’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* it is precisely the fluidity of identity that allows mimesis to be characterized on analogy with the criminal:

[The criminal] represented a deep inherent tendency in living things, whose overcoming is the mark of all development: the losing of oneself in the environment instead of actively asserting oneself, the inclination to let go, to sink back into nature. (*DE*, p. 227, translation amended).

The passage continues with the assertion that Freud calls this criminal tendency the death-drive while Roger Caillois names it mimesis. As Adorno later formulates the “criminal” in his *Aesthetic Theory*, the anti-social character of mimesis makes it the object of a social taboo. Art, for Adorno, then becomes the “refuge” for mimesis (“Kunst ist Zuflucht des mimetischen Verhaltens”10). And art, precisely as refuge for mimesis, becomes ever more increasingly mimetic alongside what Adorno sees as the increasing force of the social taboo on mimesis:

The mimetic orientation, a posture toward reality this side of the rigid opposition of subject and object, is taken up by semblance (*Schein*) in art—the organ of mimesis since the taboo on it—and, as complement to the autonomy of form, becomes the vehicle of it (*AT*, p. 162).

Art is thus transformed from a refuge for mimesis to a positive vehicle of it. What this transformation within the realm and role of art implies is a corollary transformation of the power and sweep of mimesis itself. The sinking back *into* nature does not mean becoming nature once again but is rather the attempt at assimilation with the environment. However, the “criminality” of mimesis implies that what has once severed itself from nature cannot become nature once again. Mimesis is thus the necessarily thwarted inclination to become one with nature, indeed to become nature. Mimesis ends with the act of becoming not nature, but *like* nature.

If the organic is that which tends toward decay and disintegration, mimesis is then that contradictory process whereby differentiation is produced through the inclination toward nondifferentiation—what Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, characterized as the principle of individuation. Mimesis is the vehicle of the desire for identity and unity that necessarily brings about their opposite. Put

differently: identity is precisely that concept and inclination which brings forth the nonidentical. The implication for a theory of production is clear: production is the method of creating likenesses, which, by dint of the structural impossibility of their being identical to that which they are a product of, are instead after-images not of what they seek to (re)produce but rather of their own thwarted movement toward identity. Products—artifacts—carry the mimetic trace of their own becoming, that is, of failed identity. (Commodities might then be defined as products that begin by embracing the premise of their own failed identity. The ideology of the commodity, if you will, is thus the foreclosure in advance of the movement toward identity.) It is the failure of identity, and the repetition compulsion of mimesis which attests again and again to this failure, that allows production to live up to its concept: to be production of something. It remains to be asked how the principle of identity, in its failure to live up to its own concept, nonetheless succeeds as production and reproduction of human life. Put differently, how is it that mimesis, the vehicle for the principle of identity, brings forth a likeness which both is and is not identical?

Perhaps an answer is to be found in a mimesis that transforms imitation to anticipation: “The thing-in-itself, which artworks lag after, is not an imitation of something real, but an anticipation of a thing-in-itself yet to come, of something unknown and to be determined by way of the subject” (<i>AT</i>, p. 114). Before we anticipate in Heidegger’s text a similar transformation of mimesis from imitation to anticipation, let us return to the first aspect of mimesis—and the one it shares with aesthetic judgment: its mistakenness. Heidegger writes the following in regard to the ability of one being to appear in front of another, and thereby to conceal it:

Here concealment is not simple refusal. Rather, a being appears, but it presents itself as other than it is.

This concealment is dissembling. If one being did not simulate a other, we could not make mistakes or act mistakenly in regard to beings; we could not go astray and transgress, and especially could never overreach ourselves. That a being should be able to deceive as semblance is the condition for our being able to be deceived, not conversely (<i>OWA</i>, p. 54).

The passage continues with Heidegger asserting that the double concealment, which allows a clearing for truth to happen as unconcealedness, is due specifically to the combination of concealing and dissembling. We might formulate this double concealment as a mimesis no longer concerned with imitation, simulation, or representation. This transfigured mimesis performs then

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11 Derrida writes: “‘True’ mimesis is between two producing subjects and not between two produced things. Implied by the whole third Critique, even though the explicit theme, even less the word itself, never appears, this kind of mimesis inevitably entails the condemnation of imitation, which is always characterized as being servile.” “Economimesis”, <i>diacritics</i> 11 (1981), p. 9, henceforth cited as E.
not as *re*-production but rather as production, and indeed a production premised upon an excessive mistakenness.¹² Heidegger writes: “Truth occurs precisely as itself in that the concealing denial, as refusal, provides its constant source to all clearing, and yet, as dissembling, it metes out to all clearing the indefeasible severity of error” (*OWA*, p. 55). What we thus have from Heidegger is a description of the artwork—or more correctly we should say its origin—as a two-fold concealment: as denial *and* as dissembling. I want to assert that it is between these two folds, between concealment as denial and concealment as dissembling that the *movement* of mimesis occurs. That is, it is the transition from the static concealment that occurs by way of one being put merely in front—and thereby in place—of another, to the concealment that is instead an active dissembling.

Heidegger’s characterization of the first moment of concealment as a simple displacement fits quite neatly Kant’s formulation of the subreption that occurs between subject and object in a judgment of *beauty*. The *sublime* might be construed less as the refusal of representation and more as the refusal of the displacement of subjectivity by objective subreption. Finally, this refusal of the displacement of the subject becomes the *demand*, in the sublime, for the actual *production* of the subject. This is what I began by describing as the movement back across and against mimesis, since this second moment is a movement modeled upon the incomplete movement of concealment that Heidegger calls refusal or denial. (I have elsewhere tried to trace this same movement in the relation of allegory to the symbol, whereby allegory is read as the excessive overreaching of the rhetoric of the symbol.) The work of the artwork, for Heidegger, is not contained in a second movement that *denies or cancels* the refusal and denial performed by the original moment of concealment, but rather in a setting-into-motion (or as he calls it: a setting-into-work) of the metaphysical *stasis* presumed by concealment:

. . . the nature of art was defined to begin with as the setting-into-work of truth. Yet this definition is intentionally ambiguous. It says on the one hand: art is the fixing in place of a self-establishing truth in the figure. . . . Setting-into-work, however, also means: the bringing of work-being into movement and happening (*OWA*, p. 71).

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¹² Élaine Escoubas argues persuasively that the move from a reproductive to a productive mimesis is figured in the First *Critique*’s depiction of the experience of temporality: “in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant says that *time itself does not flow away, but rather things flow away in time*. Suspension of time, neither regressive memory nor progressive anticipation but the inscription of an *immemoriality*: such is the sense of the Kantian imagination. The reflexion and *Stimmung* of imagination in its play thus coincide, in this first turn, with the ‘apprehension’ (*Auffassung*) of the pure form of time, the pure form of taking-place—which is also . . . the installation of a *mimesis* which is not reproductive but productive” (p. 60). “Kant or the Simplicity of the Sublime”, in *Of the Sublime: Presence in Question*, op. cit.
In this passage we become aware that the movement of mimesis is not just the *becoming* movement of the static, imitative, and refusing gesture, but more importantly is also “self-establishing”.

**SELF-ESTABLISHING ASPECT OF THE MOVEMENT OF MIMESIS**

We might well benefit by pausing here to consider another Heidegger essay, *Kant’s Thesis About Being*. Indeed Heidegger’s exposition of Kant’s “thesis” has a striking affinity with “Origin of the Work of Art”. Consider first that something “shines” in both texts; in the “Origin” essay, Heidegger concludes his discussion of Van Gogh’s shoe-painting as follows: “That is how self-concealing being is illuminated. Light of this kind joins its shining to and into the work. This shining, joined in the work, is the beautiful. *Beauty is one way in which truth occurs as unconcealedness*” (*OWA*, p. 56). Compare this beautiful shining with the formulation of how Kant’s thesis appears, in which Heidegger asserts that since “Kant elucidates his thesis in a merely episodic way”, an adequate understanding must

... be guided by the intention of allowing one to see how, in all Kant’s elucidations, i.e., in his basic philosophic position, his thesis everywhere shines through as the guiding idea, even when it does not form the scaffolding expressly constructed for the architectonic of his work.13

Let us appreciate the full measure of this affinity: Kant’s thesis, according to Heidegger, though it appears only in episodic elucidations, nonetheless—even “in his basic philosophic position”—“everywhere shines through”. Is not then the character of this shining *appearance* of Kant’s thesis fully aesthetic in nature? I want to that Heidegger’s text amounts to the assertion not only that a crucial element of Kant’s most basic philosophic position reveals itself in an aesthetic manner but also that Kant’s text, and his thesis, are thereby aesthetic constructs. Secondly, if shining is, according to the “Origin” formulation, the (beautiful) illumination of self-concealing being, then Kant’s thesis, precisely because it is a thesis “about being”, is revealed according to a shining illumination. Kant’s thesis, in short, cannot be disclosed expositorily but must instead show itself—though this is a dubious locution—as a shining.

What shines (through?), I want to suggest, is not being but a thesis “about” it, just as in the “Origin” essay it is not the artwork—and whatever that might be—that is illuminated but instead the shining itself. Shining is the illumination of self-concealing being not insofar as it reveals either the substance or the surface of something, but rather in its self-reflexive relation to both substance and surface. Shining is revelatory of nothing; it is instead the denial of depth and

Substance and the pleasurable acceptance of the form of appearance as complete in itself. Shining, as illumination, is not simply an embrace of surface, but as a blinding focus on the superficial is also the illumination of the transitory character of the object. The shining of an object is the illumination of what Heidegger calls the objectness of the object, and thereby—I want to suggest—the first stage of putting the object back in motion. In this regard shining is akin to positing and predication, with the crucial qualification that shining points self-reflexively at its own action of positing and predication. Shining then may be likened to the double movement of mimesis.

Kant’s thesis about being, and for Heidegger the guiding concept of Kant’s entire critical project, is that being performs as positing. And my efforts here are an attempt to describe the shining of this thesis as an aesthetic and hence reflexive phenomenon. A further implication would then be the determination that it is not the understanding or cognition in general that is responsible for the positing of being but more specifically, judgement. As Heidegger explains,

Because being is no real predicate, but is nevertheless a predicate and therefore is attributed to the object and yet cannot be elicited from the substantial content of the object, the being-predicates of modality cannot stem from the object, but rather must, as modes of positing, have their origin in subjectivity (KT, p. 25).

Being, in other words, becomes a predicate only by way of subreption. Put differently, Heidegger is attempting to extend the sweep of objective subreption beyond the realm of aesthetic judgment to include not only the whole of predication but also thought in general. Heidegger, we might say, is aestheticizing cognition. And he attempts this aestheticization first by way of reflection:

In the interpretation of being as positing, is included the fact that positing and positedness of the object are elucidated [in Kant] in terms of various relations to the power of cognition, i.e., in back reference to it, in bending back, in reflection. . . . The consideration no longer goes directly to the object of experience; it bends itself back toward the experiencing subject, it is reflection (KT, pp. 27–8).

The crucial affinity here is between reflection as the positing that occurs as the “relating back to the thinking ego” and what Heidegger intimates with the term “shining”. Shining, I want to assert, like Heidegger’s gloss on Kant’s transcendental reflection, is a self-reflexive act. Both are able to refer to themselves only after a positing of the sensuous. Both are therefore—once they have set themselves in motion—able to discard the pretence of a sensuousness that precedes their self-origination. And it is here, with this self-establishing aspect of the movement of mimesis, that we come to the heart of mimesis. And the heart of mimesis, in Heidegger, is to be found located in the thing he calls a “rift” (der Riss):
there lies hidden in nature a rift-design, a measure and a boundary and, tied to it, a capacity for bringing forth—that is, art. But it is equally certain that this art hidden in nature becomes manifest only through the work, because it lies originally in the work (OWA, p. 70).

The manifestation of the artwork is due then to the measure and boundary, the rift, that is accompanied by a “capacity for bringing forth”.\footnote{Bernstein in his The Fate of Art comments: “The rift is an active indeterminacy, a difference, and a marking-unifying in virtue of which the rift as unpresentable condition can be thought”, op. cit., p. 121.} This rift, I want to suggest, is the singular fold that exists between the twofold nature of concealing as refusal and concealing as dissembling, as well as the fold articulated by Derrida in his essay “Economimesis”:

One must not imitate nature; but nature, assigning its rules to genius, folds itself, returns to itself, reflects itself through art. This flexion provides both the principle of reflexive judgments—nature guaranteeing legality in a movement that proceeds from the particular—and the secret resource of mimesis—understood not, in the first place, as an imitation of nature by art, but as a flexion of the physis, nature’s relation to itself. There is no longer here any opposition between physis and mimesis, nor consequently between physis and tekhne; or that, at least, is what now needs to be verified (E, p. 4).

Note the injunction against imitation that begins this passage from Derrida and that also appears in Adorno’s aesthetics. In the latter it is coupled with a prescription for an alternative object of imitation: “. . . instead of imitation of nature, imitation of natural beauty” (AT, p. 105).\footnote{See Günter Figal’s Das Naturschöne als spekulative Gedankenfigur; Zur Interpretation der “Ästhetischen Theorie” im Kontext philosophischer Ästhetik (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1977).}

Mimesis, finally, is the name for the setting into motion of those objects whose stasis somehow becomes unstable—we might call them artworks. And it is precisely their illusory character as objects that puts them in the motion of mimesis.
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