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Título da proposta: ‘The fundamental problem of perception’: McDowell and Travis on the philosophical nature of perceptual experience.

Supervisor: Prof. João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter

Candidato: Daniel Mendes Campos Xavier Debarry

Instituição sede: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da USP

Abstract

We aim to offer a relevant contribution to the philosophical approach to what Charles Travis labels “The fundamental problem of perception”: according to him, the matter of “how perception can make the world bear *for* us on the thing to think”¹. We propose a detailed examination of the ongoing “Travis-McDowell Debate” on the philosophical nature of perceptual experience. Since the publication of *Mind and World* in 1994, John McDowell's thinking has been a central theme for those engaged in contemporary debates on perceptual experience. In addressing something along the lines of “the fundamental problem of perception,” McDowell stresses that perception must have a conceptual nature; “A judgment of experience does not introduce a new kind of content, but simply endorses the conceptual content (...) that is already possessed by the experience on which it is grounded”². However, an author such as Travis contends that experiences do not have representational content: “In perception, things are not presented or represented, to us as being thus and so. They are just presented to us, full stop”³. In a broad sense, the exchange between McDowell and Travis offers opposing answers to the following question: could conceptual capacities be actualized in perceptual experience itself, not only in the judgments in which a subject responds to her perceptual experience? Hence, we intend to address this issue and offer a middle-ground to the debate. To do so, we propose to develop a Kantian-inspired thesis within a contemporary framework. More specifically, we suggest that the actualization of conceptual capacities in experience reflects not empirical but categorial concepts instead. In the end, we hope to accommodate some of Travis's objections without giving up McDowell's insight that perception may involve conceptual capacities.

Keywords: McDowell; Travis; Representationalism; Anti-representationalism; Perceptual Experience; Conceptual Capacities.

¹ *PEAF*, 242, original emphasis.

² *MAW*, 48-9.

³ *TSTS*, 65.

Resumo

Pretendemos oferecer uma relevante contribuição para a abordagem filosófica do que Charles Travis chamou de “O problema fundamental da percepção”: segundo ele, a questão de “como a percepção pode fazer o mundo *nos* dar bases à coisa a ser pensada”⁴. Para isso, propomos um exame detalhado do “Debate entre Travis e McDowell” sobre a natureza filosófica da experiência perceptual. Desde a publicação de *Mente e Mundo* em 1994, o pensamento de John McDowell tem sido um tema central para aqueles engajados em debates contemporâneos sobre a experiência perceptual. Ao abordar “o problema fundamental da percepção”, McDowell enfatiza que a percepção deve possuir uma natureza conceitual: “Um juízo de experiência não introduz um novo tipo de conteúdo, mas simplesmente endossa o conteúdo conceitual (...) já possuído pela experiência na qual o juízo se fundamenta”⁵. No entanto, um autor como Travis afirma que as experiências não têm conteúdo representacional: “Na percepção, coisas não são apresentadas ou representadas para nós como sendo tal e tal. Eles apenas nos são apresentadas, ponto final”⁶. Em um sentido amplo, o debate entre McDowell e Travis oferece respostas opostas à seguinte pergunta: as capacidades conceituais podem ser atualizadas na própria experiência perceptual, e não apenas nos juízos em que um sujeito responde à sua experiência perceptual? Diante disso, pretendemos abordar essa questão e oferecer uma via média ao debate. Para tanto, propomos desenvolver uma tese de inspiração kantiana no interior de um quadro contemporâneo. Mais especificamente, sugerimos que a atualização das capacidades conceituais na experiência não reflete conceitos empíricos, mas categoriais. No final, esperamos acomodar algumas das objeções de Travis sem abrir mão do *insight* de McDowell de que a percepção pode envolver capacidades conceituais.

Palavras-chave: McDowell; Travis; Representacionismo; Anti-representacionismo; Experiência Perceptual; Capacidades Conceituais.

⁴ *PEAF*, 242.

⁵ *MEM*, 85.

⁶ *TSTS*, 65.

1. Expectations

We intend to spread and help consolidate the thoughts of McDowell and Travis within the Brazilian philosophical community, especially those interested in the philosophy of perception, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Beyond that, we aim to offer a relevant contribution to not only the exchange between McDowell and Travis *per se* but also to the debate on the philosophical nature of perceptual experience broadly. To do so, we intend to publish the research results in relevant and prestigious international and national journals of philosophy. We also see this as an opportunity to develop the candidate's research skills.

2. What is at issue

Perception provides its subjects with an encounter with the environment. It allows them to have visual awareness of the sun, auditory awareness of a foreign or native speech, olfactory awareness of the smell of lilac. In illustrating the visual awareness of a particular sunset, Travis is helpful: “one sees the sun, large and red on the horizon. One sees it sinking into the sea. One sees the red glow it leaves behind” (*PEAF*, 270). Perception, in this sense, is an occasion in which subjects perceive things in the environment that serve as a source of information about external things, such as the sun, the sea, a red glow, the sunset, etc.

As a source of information, perception helps us to know how things are. Suppose Maria ran the red light at a San Francisco intersection. On seeing that she ran the red light a policeman can come to know that he sees a red light run. This trivial example illustrates a common ground in taking perceptual judgment as rationally intelligible in the light of perception⁷. Indeed, in philosophical terms, an utterance of the form “I judge that p because I perceive that p” can be understood as revealing perceptual reasons for the judgment that p. Nevertheless, there are competing ways of making philosophical sense of perceptual judgment and its relation to perceptual experience.

Campbell (2002), Travis (*TSTS*, *RR*, *PEAF*, *TMDMD*), and Brewer (2019), for example, say that sensory awareness alone accounts for what is required for cognition to obtain. Call this view Anti-representationalism⁸. According to it, the policeman's visual

⁷ As Susanna Siegel notes, “[t]he role of perception in justifying external-world beliefs [depends] heavily on what perception tells us about the external world” (Siegel 2017:xiii).

⁸ It should be noted that there are different versions of Anti-representationalism. More specifically, Campbell holds a Relational View. For a Naïve Realist view, see Martin 2002 and Kalderon 2007; for an Object-based view, see Brewer 2006. We will reunite these versions under the label “*Anti-representationalism*” for the sake of terminological continuity.

awareness itself would be sufficient for rationally judging “that I see a red light run”⁹. Sensory awareness, then, would rationally transmit into another form of awareness, i.e., an awareness that something is the case. However, one can contend that in this transmission sensory awareness must involve the same capacities needed for the type of cognition under consideration.

Wilfrid Sellars, for instance, claims that it is incoherent to take sensory awareness alone as an episode in which something given for knowledge without the involvement of conceptual capacities such as that of judgments would be sufficient to entitle perceptual knowledge. To treat sensory awareness in such a way would be to fall into the “Myth of the Given”, as Sellars famously labeled it¹⁰. It would be so, roughly, since for Sellars attributions of knowledge must be placed in what he calls the “logical space of reasons”, a space “of justifying and being able to justify what one says”¹¹. According to this picture, *what* is knowledgeable - e.g. *that I see a red light run* - might somehow be available for cognition in sensory awareness *itself*, not only in the related perceptual judgment.

This kind of philosophical thought on sensory awareness generally advocates, as Kern (2017) indicates, the idea that “creatures capable of judgment enjoy sensory awareness whose content is defined by its possibility to serve as the content of judgments”¹². Indeed, Sellars himself stresses that one of his major aims in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* is to justify his “speaking of experiences as containing propositional claims”¹³. Following Sellars, John McDowell, in its turn, says that sensory awareness “*immediately* reveal things to be *the way* they would be judged to be in those judgements” (*AMG*, 9, *emphasis added*).

In a broad sense, we formulate this thought on perceptual experience as expressing the following view:

Conceptual Capacities View: the conceptual capacity for judgment can be actualized in sensory awareness *E* of a rational subject *s*.

And within the current context, one should note that one of our aims is to address the following query, which is condensed as follows:

⁹ As Campbell (2002) claims, sensory awareness would be a “state more primitive than thought about the object, which nonetheless, by bringing the object itself into the subjective life of the thinker, makes it possible to think about that object” (Campbell 2002:6).

¹⁰ For a philosophical and historical overview of the notion of the Myth of the Given, see Sachs 2014.

¹¹ Sellars 1956:§36.

¹² Kern 2017:189. Kern labels it as a “capacity account of knowledge”. See Kern 2017:189-92.

¹³ Sellars 1956:39.

Query: Could conceptual capacities be actualized in perceptual experience itself, not only in the judgments in which a subject responds to her perceptual experience?

3. Challenges and the means and methods to overcome them

We propose to address *Query* mainly in the light of what is presumably one of the most influential contemporary debates on the philosophical nature of perceptual experience, namely, the “Travis-McDowell Debate”¹⁴. Treated as holding a Representationalist view, McDowell claims that sensory awareness has content; as an Anti-representationalist, Travis, *contra* McDowell, argues that experiences do not involve any kind of content. For the moment, one should pay attention to the following provisional definitions:

Representationalism: The thesis that sensory awareness has representational content.

Anti-representationalism: The thesis that Representationalism is false¹⁵.

McDowell’s Representationalism is an expression of the view that “[t]hat experience has content is an implication of the idea that conceptual capacities are operative in experience” (*RGBS*, 394). He believes that the same conceptual capacities exercised in a judgment such as *that I see a red light run* must somehow be actualized in what perceptually gives reasons to the subject's propositional knowledge. In other words, McDowell suggests that the subject's sensory awareness itself must contain at least a partial act of the same capacity that is in full act in her perceptual judgment¹⁶.

He considers this kind of philosophical approach to perceptual experience as a “therapeutic” attitude that reflects the implications of a truism: “one can think, for instance, *that spring has begun*, and that very same thing, *that spring has begun*, can be the case. That is truistic (...) (*MAW*, 27, original emphasis). Both this therapeutic attitude and this type of truism have a Wittgensteinian heritage. In the case of the former, it refers to Wittgenstein's idea, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, that philosophy has only pseudo-problems, which need to be dissolved instead of solved (*PI* §124). The latter, in its turn, echoes truisms such as *Tractatus*'s famous sentence which states that “The world is everything that is the case” (*TLP* 1), a conception that McDowell surely shares with “the Wittgenstein” of the *Tractatus*¹⁷.

¹⁴ See Gersel 2018 for an overview of the debate.

¹⁵ As footnote 2 indicates, we will take Anti-representationalism as encompassing different versions of one position that, broadly speaking, denies that perceptual experiences bear any kind of representational content.

¹⁶ See *PEER*, 91.

¹⁷ See *C*, 339

Regarding the nature of perceptual experience, this important thought can be summarized as follows:

Truism: The way a subject *s* judges things to be is the way experience *E* makes things available to *s*¹⁸.

In texts such as *MAW*, *IDM*, and *APM* McDowell took *Truism* somewhat literally: “perceptible facts are essentially capable of impressing themselves on perceivers”¹⁹, since “[t]hat things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgement”²⁰. For clarity’s sake, consider language understanding. McDowell believes that language understanding should be analyzed already in meaningful terms. As McDowell sees it, understanding a language is a perceptual capacity: mastering a given language is the same as accessing the meanings expressed in that language. According to McDowell (*MAW*, *IDM*, *APM*), it might be the case, insofar as expressing as well as understanding meaning is the same as showing, respectively, “one’s mind, in one’s words (...) to those who understand one’s language” (*IDM*, 100). The idea is that in a conversation between two fluent speakers, thoughts become objects of auditory perception; in McDowell’s terms, “thoughts [or ‘thought-expressions’] are in view (in the sense in which we can speak of ‘expressing (the thought) that . . .’)” (*APM*, 123). For McDowell, in fact, although not all subjects will indeed have relevant, meaningful access to a speech - for instance, in the case of those who do not master a given language - those who understand the language get direct access to the contents of the sentences:

“Our attention is indeed drawn to the contents of the used sentences, rather than the mere words (...): but not as something ‘beneath’ the words, to which we are to penetrate by stripping off linguistic clothing; rather, as something present in the words - something capable of being heard (...) in the words by those who understand the language. (...) the thought (say) that some table-tops are square can be heard (...) in the words ‘Some table-tops are square’, by people who would be able to put their own minds into those words if they had occasion to do so” (*IDM*, 99).

Although one can take *Truism* as philosophically welcome due to its modesty - a subject naturally judges *that things are thus and so* because she perceives *that things are thus*

¹⁸ See *RBGS*, 391.

¹⁹ *MAW*, 28.

²⁰ *MAW*, 26; original emphasis.

and so - it faces several objections²¹. One of the problems with the idea that sensory awareness has propositional content is that, if so, we might presuppose that experience includes, or makes perceptually manifest, a proposition; for example, if the policeman has a red light run in view the content of his perceptual experience might contain, according to *MAW*'s position, a proposition such as *that I see a red light run*.

Travis's Anti-representationalism exactly expresses a denial of the idea that propositional contents - or meanings - are things that belong to the scope of sensory awareness. For Travis, the right manner to make sense of the nature of perceptual experiences is to take them as bringing things like a red light run, and not propositions such as *that I see a red light run*, into view. In borrowing the following remark of Frege, Travis aims to clarify the idea: "But don't we see that the sun has risen? And don't we thus also see that this is true? That the sun has risen is no object which sends out rays that reach my eyes, no visible thing as the sun itself is. That the sun has risen is recognized on the basis of sensory impressions. For all that, being true is not a perceptually observable property"²².

McDowell himself has admitted that "Travis has forced [him] to think about such cases" (*AMG*, 259), and more recently rejected credit experiences with propositional content. McDowell's new position inaugurates in *AMG*. Along the lines of a certain reading of Kant's account of intuitions, McDowell now claims that the contents of perception are not propositional but "intuitional": "What we need is an idea of content that is not propositional but intuitional, in what I take to be a Kantian sense"²³. Although McDowell insists that *thinkables* - what one can think, for instance, the thought *that I see a red light run* - must somehow be *contents* of perceptual experience, he takes *thinkables* as not being *objects* of sensory awareness anymore. That is to say, these conceptual capacities, as McDowell stresses, would no longer impact the objects of sensory awareness. Moreover, intuitional contents, although still conceptual, would not have a propositional character anymore.

Be that as it may, one must note that McDowell's former and new positions are different expressions of the *same* thought, recall, that "[t]hat experience has content is an implication of the idea that conceptual capacities are operative in experience" (*RGBS*, 394, emphasis added). So let's see in more detail in what sense McDowell ascribes conceptual content to experiences as well as Travis's objections to McDowell's *Conceptual Capacities View*.

²¹ See, for example, *TSTS*, Hanna 2006, Cussins 2002. For more objections, see Smith 2002.

²² Cited in *PEAF*, 229.

²³ *AMG*, 260.

Before we can grasp what is at stake in the “Travis-McDowell Debate”, it is crucial to clarify the terminology used in the debate, especially “representation”. “Representationalism” encompasses a specific notion of representation within the debate. Wilson (2018) helpfully frames and presents the kind of representation (*p-representation*, as Wilson calls it) that authors such as McDowell and Travis have in mind²⁴. Now, let us see, through four conditions suggested by Travis (*TSTS*, 63) and condensed by Wilson (2018:201), the set of characteristics of the so-called p-representation:

- (i) *Objectivity*: “The representation in question consists in representing things as so (thus, truly/veridically, or falsely/non-veridically).”²⁵
- (ii) *Face Value*: “It has, or gives perceptual experience, a face value, at which it can be taken or declined (or discounted).”
- (iii) *Givenness*: “It is not autorepresentation [representation-by the subject]. (It is allrepresentation [representation-to the subject], though here, not crucially.)”²⁶
- (iv) *Availability*: “When we are thus represented to, we can recognize that and how, this is so; most pertinently, we can appreciate what it is that is thus represented to us as so”²⁷.

We cannot deal in detail with each and one of these four conditions for p-representation here, though we will have closer look at *Face Value* and *Availability*, according to Wilson’s (2019) suggestion that Travis’s Anti-representationalist objections concerns two main challenges to the Representationalist: on the one hand, what he labels “the individuation question”, which asks for an explanation of how the contents of experience

²⁴ The type of representation in question does not refer, for example, to the idea that a map can represent the city of London; also, it does not suggest that rings on a tree can represent its age. For instance, as Prinz claims “carrying information is not sufficient for representation” (Prinz 2004:53). In effect, rings do not actually represent age, just as smoke does not in fact represent fire. To say that rings represent a tree’s age is merely a way to express something like “the rings indicate the tree’s age”. Cf. Dretske (1981, 1986). Moreover, it does not refer to the existence of subpersonal representations described by neuroscience or the psychology of perception. Cf. Burge 2005. As Wilson 2018:201 points out, although there is a fact that the subpersonal representations are related to experience, what is at stake for Travis is what would figure as the content of personal-level experiences. McDowell shares this kind of thought with Travis. See, for example, *TBD*, where McDowell contrasts his position with Burge’s.

²⁵ *Objectivity* suggests that p-representations have correctness conditions, in the sense that a correct perception would be true. Thus, p-representation, characterized as a representation of “things as such”, must involve conceptual capacities, if we want to establish a properly normative relationship between judgment, truth, and experience. According to McDowell, the point is that not only perceptual judgments have conceptual content: experience itself has the same type of content.

²⁶ Unlike judgment, we cannot, in fact, choose the content of what we perceive. This is the idea behind *Givenness*. According to a famous dictum of *MAW*, “[i]n experience one finds oneself saddled with content” (*MAW*, 10, emphasis added). Whereas perceptual judgments have an active nature, McDowell invites us to presuppose that sensory awareness involves a passive operation of conceptual capacities. This means, according to McDowell’s suggestion, that p-representation is not a matter of autorepresentation, that is, a content resulting from a representation *by* the subject, as in the case of judgments, but of allrepresentation, once the content is given *to* the subject in sensory awareness.

²⁷ Wilson 2018:201.

obtain; on the other hand, “the availability question”, which, in its turn, asks for an explanation of how the contents of experience are involved in a subject’s personal-level cognitive state²⁸.

Face Value's characteristics are surely presented in McDowell's thought. The idea is that sensory awareness makes available something that has a determinate face value: for example, a given sensory awareness may p-represent *that Maria ran the light*. This particular way of *being such and such* leaves to the subject the acceptance or rejection of the face value of her sensory awareness. To accept sensory awareness at face value would be to judge that things are as they appear; to reject its face value would be, in McDowellian terms, to “refrain” from an initial inclination to judge that a thing is the way it appears²⁹. According to Wilson (2019:203), however, Travis rejects *Face Value* on the basis that perceptual judgments are ulterior to perceptual experience. The idea here is that the Anti-representationalist need not withhold that propositional contents are intrinsically related to sensory awareness since for them there would be nothing wrong in supposing that non-representational sensory awareness token representational contents that occur only downstream from experience, as in the case of perceptual judgments. The contents of perceptual judgments, then, would not be dependent or derived upon experiences.

Availability, in its turn, is an implication of *Face Value* and *Givenness*: the content given in sensory awareness is available to be accepted or declined and it is a matter of allorepresentation, that is to say, a case in which the subject is a consumer and not a producer of the content of her sensory awareness. What we want to stress is that (i) the content must convey to the subject that *o* is *F*, even if she refrains from the initial inclination and judge otherwise - as *per Face Value* - and (ii) that the content cannot be explained by any non-perceptual state, such as a judgment, as *per Givenness*. In sum, *Availability* suggests that what makes it possible to recognize the content of the p-representation is the way things appear in sensory awareness. However, Wilson highlights that according to Travis, the Representationalist would not be capable of providing an account that explains *how*

²⁸ See Wilson 2019:217.

²⁹ This would be the case of illusions or hallucinations. Müller-Lyer's illusion is a well-known example. This illusion presents us with two segments A and B with identical lengths, which give the impression of having different dimensions. In an illusion of this type, what is given in sensory awareness is defeasible, since there may be circumstances where a subject has reasons to believe that her sensory awareness is misleading, thus being able to judge that the things p-represented are not the way they appear. If, on the contrary, the subject is not aware of these reasons, she tends to judge that things are as they appear. In this regard, McDowell states: “Minimally, it must be possible to decide whether or not to judge that things are as one's experience represents them to be. How one's experience represents things to be is not under one's control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the appearance or rejects it” (*MAW*, 11).

p-representational contents are available to the subject independently of non-perceptual states, such as judgments. Moreover, the Representationalist, for Travis, would not be capable of showing how one could recognize what makes experience to be veridical on the basis of what is given through the p-representational content.

Within this context, let's see how Travis presents what Wilson labels "*The Argument from Looks*". As Wilson suggests, "Travis's argumentative strategy is relatively straightforward"³⁰: p-representation does not hold, and so Representationalism is false, according to Travis, insofar as *Face Value* and *Availability* cannot be conciliated - for reasons that will become clear soon. Wilson frames the argument as follows:

P1 If visual experiences were p-representational then their content would be recognizable in virtue of how, in experience, things perceptually appear, or look [to the subject]. (*Looks-indexing*)

P2 Visual looks are incapable of making p-representational content recognizable since they are comparative and so equivocal between multiple contents.

P3 Thinkable looks are incapable of making p-representational content recognizable since they are not wholly perceptual.

P4 There is no further notion of looks that is both wholly perceptual and capable of making p-representational content recognizable.

C1 (*From P2 through P4*) The content of visual experiences cannot be recognizable on the basis of how things look [to the subject].

C2 (*From P1 and C1*) Visual experiences are not p-representational"³¹.

Wilson stresses that according to the *Argument from Looks*", Representationalists face the following "dilemma":

"In order to defend their view, they must either (a) elucidate some notion of looks that is capable of making the relevant content available - something that Travis argues is impossible - by rejecting one of P2 through P4, or (b) reject *Looks-indexing*, or one of Travis's other conditions for p-representation, substantially weakening and potentially undermining their view"³².

Next, let's have a look at the notions of *thinkable* and *visual* looks, so we can have a better understanding of Travis's objections.

In the case of *visual looks*, an object or scene presents itself as having a look that is comparable to the *looks* of other objects or scenes. As Wilson claims, "visual looks relate to

³⁰ Wilson 2019:205.

³¹ Wilson 2018:206.

³² Wilson 2019:207.

resemblances between objects”³³. Consider the visual awareness of a red rose. The problem with *visual looks*, according to Travis, is its equivocal character: a plastic red rose may look like a red rose as much as a real red rose does. If this is the case, it is not clear which content is associated with the *visual look*. Furthermore, it would not make much sense to speak of correctness conditions here, as the plastic red rose is not actually a real red rose. The plastic red rose looks like a real red rose not because one’s experience p-represents that *o* is *F*, i.e., that *the plastic red rose is a real red rose*. What experience reveals to the subject is a plastic imitation of a real red rose which is comparable to a real red rose in the way it looks to be. In other words, Travis contends that the object of visual awareness must be the relevant object, i.e., a plastic imitation of a real red rose that is comparable to a real red rose. As *per* (P2), then, Travis argues that *visual looks* fail to meet *Looks-indexing*, insofar as what visually looks to be something cannot fix the content of visual awareness.

In the case of *thinkable looks*, the way in which an object or a scene appears can be taken as evidence for propositional content: it can look, say, *that the rose is red*, something which can also suggest a perceptual judgment with the same content. In Travis’s words, a *thinkable look* is “a matter of what can be gathered from, or what is suggested by, the facts at hand, or those visibly (audibly, etc.) on hand” (*TSTS*, 76). In that sense, to be indexed is the same as to have identical content to that of the judgments a given p-representation may incline one to make. Suppose that John has in view an object that looks to be a red rose. Now, think of him as taking the same object as being a plastic red rose, as he, say, just bought one minutes ago. Travis’s point is that as long as the two experiences are supposed to be qualitatively indistinguishable, whatever way John takes the relevant object to be - as a real or a plastic red rose - cannot be explained by sensory awareness alone. However, if one argues that the *thinkable look* is what indexes the p-representational content of the experience, what is left for the Representationalist is to explain *thinkable looks* as subsequent from sensory awareness, in this case, as being the result of non-perceptual states, such as a perceptual judgment. Therefore, insofar as the information available in experience, in a Representationalist framework, must determine p-representational content solely in virtue of how things perceptually appear or look, *thinkable looks* cannot be wholly perceptual. As *per* (P3), then, *thinkable looks* would also fail to meet *Looks-indexing*.

That said, why, according to these definitions of *visual* and *thinkable looks*, *Availability* and *Face Value* end up being incompatible with one another? For Travis, on the

³³ Wilson 2019:209.

one hand, *Availability* induces the Representationalist to embrace the notion of *visual looks*; on the other hand, *Face Value* inclines the Representationalist toward *thinkable looks*. There are two problems here. First, if appearances are wholly perceptual, they are not capable of showing the world in any particular way, as *per* (P2): *visual looks* are equivocal between multiple p-representational contents. Second, if appearances are indexed, experiences could not be wholly perceptual, since sensory awareness alone would not be capable of indexing *thinkable looks*³⁴.

On the face of it, one can argue that the Representationalist should reject (P4), in trying to offer a notion of looks that is not *thinkable* or *visual* and still be capable of satisfying *Availability* and *Face Value*. However, since these conditions, at least according to Travis, are incompatible, it is not possible for one to hold *Face Value* without rejecting (P1), i.e. without rejecting *Looks-indexing*. One difficulty in trying to reject (P1) is to do it without weakening the very idea of p-representation. As Wilson says, “the representationalist faces the difficulty of specifying how, if not in virtue of appearances, *Availability* might be satisfied”³⁵. Nevertheless, this is exactly what McDowell wants with his new position on the nature of perceptual experience.

McDowell’s new position can be understood as a search for a rejection of *Looks-indexing*. In fact, he seems to be trying to find ways to offer a notion of content which is both “wholly perceptual” - since contents are no longer *objects* of sensory awareness - and “capable of making p-representational content recognizable” - which concerns his insistence that *thinkables* must be involved in sensory awareness. Wilson stresses that in order to defend a position such as that of McDowell one needs to show *how* “perceptual content is consciously available to the subject, but not in virtue of how things appear or look, and so *Looks-indexing* is false”³⁶. That is to say, one needs to offer a way of satisfying the notion of *Availability* other than through *Looks-indexing*. In that respect, Wilson asks the Representationalist the following question:

“*Availability question*: What makes p-representational content recognizable, or cognitively available, to the subject?”³⁷.

³⁴ As Wilson puts it, “[P]erceptual appearances themselves are incapable of making p-representational content available. Appearances, or looks, are (according to Travis) either equivocal or non-perceptual, neither of which can explain the availability of perceptual content to the subject” (Wilson 2018:212).

³⁵ Willson 2018:211.

³⁶ Wilson 2018:217.

³⁷ Wilson 2018:217.

We understand that McDowell's new position is an attempt to give his own answer to something along the lines of the *Availability question*. So our aim now is to unpack McDowell's thoughts on the issue, in the context of his debate with Travis.

A good way to make sense of what is at stake here is to start from the different readings of Travis and McDowell on remarks of Frege such as this:

“Sense impressions are certainly a necessary ingredient of sensory observation, and these are part of the inner world (...). These by themselves do not open the outer world for us. Perhaps there is a being that only has sense impressions, without seeing or feeling things. Having sense impressions is not yet seeing things (...). Having sense impressions is, to be sure, necessary for seeing things, but not sufficient. What must still be added is not something sensory. And it is just this which unlocks the outer world for us; for without this non-sensory thing each of us remains shut up in his inner world”³⁸.

McDowell and Travis dispute what is at stake in this passage as endorsing their own views. So our task now is to explain how each and one of them interpret what Frege means here, and then clarify how this relates to Travis's *Argument from Looks* as well as to McDowell's rejection of *Looks-indexing*.

It is noteworthy that Frege establishes a notional difference between *sense impressions* and *seeing*. On the one hand, “sense impressions” should be understood as the sensory awareness of objects, say, a flower. On the other hand, Frege takes “seeing” as a result of the entering of conceptual capacities that enable one to intelligibly grasp a fact such as *that this flower is red*. So the “non-sensory ingredient” - in our terms, the actualization of conceptual capacities - would be what enables one not to be “blind” to such facts, as it would happen with the imagined subject who may lack the capacity to properly “see,” and not just “sense” things.

As Travis reads Frege, the *only* objects of sensory awareness would be sense impressions, such as that of a flower. As we already saw, that is surely compatible with Travis's idea that conceptual capacities operate only downstream from perceptual experience. That means for him, in the present context, that the related representational contents of judgments could not be available to the subject *in* experience.

In the wake of Frege, Travis makes a distinction between what would be two senses of seeing: namely, “O-seeing” and “T-seeing”³⁹. O-seeing is seeing objects - something that one can be sensorily aware of; T-seeing is seeing in the sense of one seeing *that things are*

³⁸ Cited in *TMDMD*, 233.

³⁹ See *PEAF*, 238.

thus and so - what one does when exercising conceptual capacities. In the same spirit of the “sunset” example, Frege says: “But don’t I see that this flower has five petals? One can say that, but then uses the word ‘see’ not in the sense of mere sensing things via light, but one means a thought or judgement connected with that”⁴⁰. As Travis stresses, what Frege means here is that “what is operative in seeing-T - what distinguishes it from O-seeing as non-perceptual accomplishment - is a non-sensory (*nichtsinnliche*) ingredient, just the sort of ingredient which, he tells us, ‘unlocks an outer world for us’” (*PEAF* 240, original emphasis).

McDowell agrees with Travis’s Frege that *thinkables* cannot be objects of sensory awareness: “Travis says, correctly, that the thing to think, the thinkable, specified in the ‘that’-clause that is the complement of an expression of T-seeing (...) is not related to sensory awareness in the way things like flowers can be” (*TFKG*, 34). In effect, as we saw, this is part of McDowell’s new position: the propositional content - what can be expressed by a “that”-clause - no longer figures as an object of sensory awareness. However, McDowell thinks that his interlocutor mistakenly reads Frege in considering that the distinction between O-seeing and T-seeing would not admit *any* involvement of *thinkables* in perceptual experience. To put it another way, Travis’s Frege would think that the *only* way *thinkables* may be involved in perceptual experience would be by being objects of sensory awareness, which, in fact, would be unacceptable. Then, T-seeing (in the present sense, what can be the content of sensory awareness) could not satisfy *Availability*, insofar as what might satisfy *Looks-indexing* could not be something with a non-sensory character.

Nonetheless, one should note that what McDowell wants is exactly to give expression to the idea that despite the fact that *thinkables* could not be *objects* of sensory awareness they could still be *contents* of sensory awareness: “Frege’s distinction entails only the conclusion I cited Travis correctly drawing from it: thinkables are not *objects* of sensory awareness. Thinkables can still be *contents* of sensory awareness. (...) our sensory awareness of objects makes the rationality of judgments about them intelligible by virtue of the fact that some ways objects are given in our sensory awareness itself” (*TFKG*, 35). From that perspective, McDowell sees himself as able to offer a way of rejecting *Looks-indexing* without rejecting *Availability*. But if that is the case, in what sense are contents, with their non-perceptual character, available to the subject in perceptual experience itself, if not in virtue of *looks*? Well, McDowell thinks that *Availability* is a condition for avoiding the Myth of the Given. If so, he argues that it is a requirement for one’s “judgments [to] be rational in

⁴⁰ Cited in *PEAF*, 239.

the light of our sensory awareness [that] one [must] recognizes a seen object as being [so] on the basis of ways it is presented as being in one's visual experience of it" (*TFKG*, 34). Roughly, McDowell's bet is that avoiding the Myth presuppose *Availability*, in spite of Travis's demand that representational contents must have a non-perceptual character. In other words, he believes that if *thinkables* cannot be objects of sensory awareness, they *must* be contents of sensory awareness, so one can avoid the Myth of the Given.

Note that McDowell's new position takes sensory awareness as bearing two intertwined features: on the one hand, its *objects*; on the other hand, its *contents* (the p-representation of something being some way). When a subject sees a red rose, though "*being a red rose*" is not the object of her experience she somehow entertains the content "*being a red rose*" while having the experience. However, we believe that McDowell's new position exhibits a twofold problem.

On the one hand, the way McDowell's new position takes what it is for a rational subject to enjoy sensory awareness doesn't seem to show any advantage over Anti-representationalist accounts. Since contents are no longer taken as objects of sensory awareness, it seems that according to McDowell's new position perceptual awareness is actually *not* representational. Well, if now contents do not occur at the level of perception, what is the significant difference between Representationalist and Anti-representationalist accounts? Note that McDowell's new position, in fact, seems to take a step closer to Travis's Anti-Representationalism: the objects of sensory awareness, as Travis also indicates, are exhausted by items in the environment, such as red roses, and not by things such as *being a red rose*. Moreover, we think that it seems hard to simply suppose that this kind of operation of concepts in sensory awareness does not have the very character of a judgment. It is true that McDowell takes care to say that it is the "Understanding", not us, who puts concepts to work in experiential intakes. But if it is so, once again, what is the significant difference between McDowell and Travis? Surely, Travis indicates something very similar: concepts come into the picture only in response to experience. As a consequence, it seems uncertain if for McDowell the role played by concepts amounts to a judgment-like process, insofar as perceptual awareness *per se* no longer has content. In fact, more recently McDowell oscillates between a view in which the contents of sensory awareness are taken to be non-propositional and one in which he "did not mean to be renouncing the idea that experiences have the sort of content judgments have" (*RTT*, 260). One may plausibly say, for instance, that judgments occur so fast that, in a first-person perspective, it seems that they occur as long as we take the world in. As Connolly helpfully illustrates, "[r]acecar drivers

frequently look at gauges, and they learn to make very quick inferences about what those gauges monitor”⁴¹. The point here is that although the racecar driver infers a judgment, say, that she is out of gas, it may seem to her *as if* the judgment occurs instantaneously, i.e. it may seem that such content is non-inferentially given in experience. One may even say that, in a sense, in looking at the gauge the driver sees that she is out of gas, even though she actually made a judgment based on her visual awareness of the gauge.

On the other hand, the fact that the objects of sensory awareness no longer bear contents seems to weaken McDowell’s insistence on the idea that experiences still have p-representational content; at last, McDowell now shares Travis’s conclusion that the “objects of judgement are not to be found before our eyes” (*TMDMD*, 38). The problem here is that McDowell may hold an Anti-representationalist view after all. As long as both Travis and McDowell consider contents as being responses *to* what is being experienced, the matter of “when” this happens - *downstream* from or *as we take* in experience - seems to be insignificant from a first-person perspective, as the racecar driver example suggests. If so, we believe that it would be possible for the Anti-representationalist to co-opt McDowell’s Representationalist account insofar as the very objects of sensory awareness would not play any proper significant rational role in perceptual judgments anymore. In our view, this is exactly the case, since p-representational contents would not have any *perceptual* effect on sensory awareness.

What we want to emphasize is that if one wishes to credit experiences with rational significance, the actualization of conceptual capacities should be described as having a perceptual effect, not (merely) a cognitive effect on sensory awareness. And although we believe that McDowell offers useful insight to those who want to answer *Query* within a *Conceptual Capacities View* framework, we think that a story about the involvement of conceptual capacities in sensory awareness must be able to rehabilitate the rational role played by the *objects* of perceptual experience.

To address “The fundamental problem of perception”, then, we suggest a slight change in the way it is formulated. Our question would be instead “how *the objects* of perception can make the world bear *for us* on the thing to think”? And insofar as both Travis and McDowell see the perceptual experience as something which provides means from judging non-inferentially *that things are thus and so*, we believe, after all, that one should

⁴¹ Connolly 2019:33-4.

offer, with the help of McDowell and Travis, an account of perceptual experience in these terms. That's the goal of this research proposal.

To do so, we intend to develop a Kantian-inspired thesis within a contemporary framework. Surely, Kant's account of intuitions may be read as an ancestor of the contemporary debate on the philosophical nature of perceptual experience. Several interpretations of his ideas are used as insights to problems typically discussed in analytic philosophy. Robert Hanna, for example, highlights that “contemporary non-conceptualism (...) can be traced directly back from Evans's *Varieties of Reference* to the first *Critique*”⁴². In sum, what we want to stress is that Kant's account of intuition is somewhat unavoidable in the debate we aim to address.

More specifically, we intend to examine what Travis, within his debate with McDowell, labeled as “Kant's slogan”, which refers to the following dictum of Kant⁴³: “The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding” (*CPR*: A79/B104-5). This much discussed passage is read by McDowell as follows: “The unity of intuitional content reflects an operation of the same unifying function that is operative in the unity of judgements (...). That is why it is right to say the content unified in intuitions is of the same kind as the content unified in judgements: that is, conceptual content. We could not have intuitions, with their specific forms of unity, if we could not make judgements, with their corresponding forms of unity” (*AMG*, 264).

The significance of Kant's slogan, in fact, has a lot to do with McDowell's new position. It illuminates a way to take the logical form of judgments to have a distinctive role in intuitions. More specifically, for people such as McDowell Kant's slogan recommends that the capacity for judgment can be actualized in a non-propositional way in intuitions. However, one must have in mind that according to Travis, a perceptual judgment, plausibly, is explanatorily subsequent to sensory awareness⁴⁴. Until then, though, Travis believes that sensory awareness should be treated as neutral in how it *will* be represented as being some way in a perceptual judgment - say, as being a red light run.

⁴² Hanna 2006:85.

⁴³ See *PEAF*, 224.

⁴⁴ Cf. Wilson 2019: “On the plausible assumption that perceptual belief is explanatorily subsequent to experience, the latter need have no content independently of the former. This is Travis's view” (Wilson 2019:203).

Although one can agree with Travis that propositions are not objects of sensory awareness, one may contend that this putative neutrality of perceptual experience has some limitations. For example, think of someone who comes from a place, let us assume, where there is no such thing as a red light run, and who sees the same scene at the same time and location as the policeman did. Plausibly, on the one hand, one may say that the foreign's sensory awareness did not inform her that someone ran the red light; on the other hand, as the policeman's sensory awareness somehow informed him about someone running the red light, one may also say that the policeman visual awareness contains more - or at least a different - information about the scene. This raises the following question: is there any significant difference between the perceptual experiences of the San Francisco policeman and the foreign person?

Our purpose in this research project is to argue that the information about the world available in perceptual experience is, in spite of Travis, significantly dependent on the subject's conceptual capacities. We think that our conceptual capacities may have a perceptual effect on sensory awareness, insofar as these capacities are actualized in a distinct manner in them. Though in line with Travis's condition that propositions cannot be objects of sensory awareness, our aim is to search for another path to accommodate the idea that conceptual capacities can be actualized in perceptual experiences.

To offer a middle-ground to the debate we intend to reformulate McDowell's reading of Kant's Slogan. Our aim is to develop a version of a *Conceptual Capacities View* as an approach to intuitions - or experiential intakes - based on the proposal that things such as a red light run are perceived *in terms of single units*, thanks to the operation of *a priori concepts* (or the *categories*) in perceptual experience itself⁴⁵. Our approach, however, differs in one crucial aspect to McDowell's. Whereas for McDowell Kant's Slogan indicates that *empirical* concepts are in play in perceptual experience - "I conceived [perceptual

⁴⁵ The phenomenon of "unitization" is illustrative. Here is Connolly (2017) on unitization: "In unitization, a person comes to perceive as a single property, what they previously perceived as two or more distinct properties. One example of unitization is the perception of written words. When we perceive a written word in English, we do not simply perceive two or more distinct letters. Rather, we perceive those letters as a single word. Put another way, we perceive written words as a single unit (...). This is not the case with non-words. When we perceive short strings of letters that are not words, we do not perceive them as a single unit". Although Connolly investigates it in terms of the interdisciplinary relations between philosophy and cognitive science, we understand that such a phenomenon can help us give sense of the idea that the conceptual capacity for unitization can be actualized not only in judgments but also in perception. Note that perceiving things in terms of single unities is a perceptual phenomenon; in our terms, it is the result of a perceptual effect of the capacity for unitization upon sensory awareness. Nevertheless, one may take it as playing a justificatory role without the involvement of empirical concepts. Once we perceive, say, a word as a single unity, we need not make inferences or apply empirical concepts to perceive it that way.

experience] in terms of how experience makes it possible to bring perceived items under this or that empirical concept” (RTS, 243) - we argue instead that perceptual experience reflects *general* concepts, such as that of *unity*, as Kant's Slogan claims. In the end, we hope to accommodate some of Travis's objections without giving up McDowell's insight that for perceptual experiences and perceptual judgments to bear a rational relation to each other they better involve the actualization of conceptual capacities.

4. Schedule

| Activities | Term 1 | Term 2 | Term 3 | Term 4 | Term 1 | Term 2 | Term 3 | Term 4 |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Reading on McDowell | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Reading on Travis | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Reading on Secondary Literature | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Writing on Results | | | X | X | X | X | | |
| Submission of the results to academic publishing | | | | | | X | X | X |
| Event/Group/Seminar participation/organization | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

4. Dissemination and Assessment

We aim to collaborate with international and Brazilian thinkers and researchers through partnerships with research groups and centers. Moreover, we aim to participate in relevant congresses, seminars, conferences, and the like to present and discuss our research results. Besides that, we intend to organize events focusing on the topics discussed in this research project. Finally, our goal is to publish the relevant research results in prestigious national and international philosophy academic publishing (Qualis/CAPES A1 e A2).

5. Other support

6. Bibliography

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ANEXO I - PARECERES DE ASSESSORES *AD HOC* FAVORÁVEIS AO PROJETO JUNTO À FAPESP (Segue na próxima página)

Observações ao Beneficiário

Comunicamos que sua solicitação de bolsa, constante do processo acima referido, foi analisada e aprovada pela FAPESP.

Por favor, aguarde o email com as instruções para confirmação de interesse pela concessão.

Para conhecimento do conteúdo do despacho, por favor, acesse o Sistema SAGe (www.fapesp.br/sage), selecionando o item do menu Meus Processos > Número do Processo e, em Mais Informações, a opção Despacho.

Com exceção de bolsa de Pós Doutorado, a transcrição do parecer está disponível exclusivamente para o orientador, sendo de sua responsabilidade escolher os trechos a serem compartilhados com o candidato.

Para qualquer consulta ou comunicação sobre esta correspondência, por favor, use exclusivamente os serviços do "Converse com a FAPESP" em www.fapesp.br/converse.

Atenciosamente,

Marcio de Castro Silva Filho
Diretor Científico

Frases para o Beneficiário

Não há frases associadas.

Transcrição de Parecer para o Beneficiário**Parecer da 1ª Assessoria****APRECIÇÃO GERAL DA PROPOSTA**

A FAPESP denomina "Proposta" o conjunto de três partes a serem avaliadas, composto por: 1. Projeto de Pesquisa; 2. Histórico Acadêmico do Candidato; e 3. Histórico de Pesquisa do Supervisor. Por favor, preencha os itens de análise desta página depois de preencher o restante do formulário.

Em linhas gerais, o projeto tem como objetivo propor "um exame detalhado do debate entre Travis e McDowell sobre a natureza filosófica da experiência perceptual". Parte importante da proposta é, como destacado pelo projeto, "desenvolver uma tese de inspiração kantiana no interior de um quadro contemporâneo". Duas observações: (1) O projeto, ao propor o confronto entre duas posições filosóficas sobre o problema a ser investigado (as de Travis e McDowell sobre a natureza filosófica da experiência perceptual), deve chegar, ao que tudo indica, a um resultado que deve esclarecer não apenas o que essas posições defendem, mas também mostrar ponto cego do conflito, não tematizado por elas. Deve, assim, ir além do exame das posições em confronto, em particular inserindo a posição de Kant sobre a relação entre a unidade da síntese de dados sensíveis e a unidade do juízo. Teria sido conveniente, embora não indispensável nesse ponto, que o projeto, que também pretende ter uma contribuição no debate brasileiro, levasse em conta o estado da arte, mesmo que brevemente, dos estudos afins realizados no País, caso haja. (2) ao propor investigar o problema central (1) inspirando-se no espírito de Kant, deve debruçar-se sobre a dedução metafísica dos conceitos puros, apresentada sumariamente no projeto como "slogan" kantiano. Em relação a esse segundo ponto, cabe observar que o projeto não destaca se irá se deter sobre a concepção kantiana de juízo (espelhada também na diferença entre juízo de percepção e juízo de experiência, tema do projeto); pois uma das questões suscitadas pela aproximação com Kant é saber o quanto essa concepção se aproxima ou não da concepção contemporânea de juízo, de modo que não se pode falar, sem mais, de juízo em geral como concepção homogênea de Kant até nossos dias. Nesse sentido, se for o caso, a proposta poderia contemplar os estudos de Béatrice Longuenesse sobre a teoria kantiana de juízo, a diferença com a concepção contemporânea e como se espelha na distinção entre juízo de percepção e juízo de experiência. Também será pertinente que o projeto recorra a uma tradução mais atual da Crítica da razão pura, por mais que a de Kemp Smith, citada bibliografia, seja útil. Destacamos, por fim, que as observações (1) e (2) não têm o intuito de apontar um problema central do projeto, muito bem fundamentado, apenas levantar dois pontos que devem ser ponderados em seu desenvolvimento.

1. Por favor, analise o PROJETO DE PESQUISA proposto, conforme roteiro abaixo:**1.a. Definição e pertinência dos objetivos.**

O projeto define muito claramente os objetivos, bem justificados ao longo da argumentação.

1.b. Originalidade e importância da contribuição pretendida para a área de conhecimento em que o projeto se insere.

O projeto, ao propor o confronto entre algumas posições filosóficas sobre o problema a ser investigado, deve chegar, ao que tudo indica, a um resultado que deve esclarecer não apenas o que essas posições defendem, mas também mostrar ponto cego do conflito, não tematizado por elas. Deve, assim, ir além do exame das posições em confronto, em particular inserindo a posição de Kant sobre a relação entre a unidade da síntese de dados sensíveis e a unidade do juízo. Teria sido conveniente que o projeto, que também pretende ter uma contribuição no debate brasileiro, relatasse o estado da arte, mesmo que brevemente, dos estudos afins realizados no País.

1.c. Fundamentação científica e os métodos empregados.

O projeto está muito bem fundamentado, amparado proposta sólida e em bibliografia relevante.

1.d. Adequação do projeto a um programa de pós-doutorado.

Adequado.

1.e. Análise da viabilidade da execução do projeto utilizando a infraestrutura disponível e no prazo previsto.

Adequado.

1.f. O Plano de Gestão de Dados descreve os tipos de dados a serem produzidos pelo projeto, as formas de seu armazenamento, preservação e compartilhamento.

Adequado para a área de filosofia.

Conclusão sobre a análise do Projeto de Pesquisa apresentado. (Preenchimento obrigatório)

- Excelente
 Muito boa
 Muito boa, com algumas deficiências facilmente sanáveis
 Boa
 Boa com deficiências
 Regular
 Com sérias deficiências

2. Por favor, analise o HISTÓRICO ACADÊMICO DO CANDIDATO seguindo o roteiro abaixo:**2.a. Adequação da formação do candidato ao projeto proposto e da qualidade e regularidade de sua produção como pesquisador, avaliada por publicações em periódicos especializados com seletiva política editorial, livros ou capítulos de livros, patentes em que figura como outros instrumentos de propriedade intelectual; resultados de pesquisa efetivamente transferidos e adotados por empresas ou pelo governo; e outras informações que possam ser relevantes.**

O projeto de pesquisa adequa-se perfeitamente à trajetória acadêmica do candidato, em especial aos trabalhos defendidos no mestrado e no doutorado .

2.b. Analise a experiência internacional em pesquisa do candidato (estágios curtos e longos, participação em colaborações), considerando a qualidade dos resultados publicados.

O doutorado, financiado pela Capes, inclui um período de seis meses, como doutorado sanduíche, na University of Warwick (UK).

2.c. A FAPESP considera prioritária a concessão de bolsas a candidatos que concluíram recentemente seu doutorado. Não sendo este o caso, analise as circunstâncias especiais que possam justificar a concessão da bolsa solicitada.**2.d. Outros aspectos julgados relevantes para avaliar seu potencial como pesquisador.**

O candidato, tendo defendido seu doutorado em outubro de 2022, possui 2 publicações: um artigo na Principia e outro na OUTRAMARGEM: REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA, respectivamente Qualis A 1 e Qualis B 4, classificação relativa ao período 2017 - 2020.

Conclusão sobre a análise do Histórico Escolar e Acadêmico do Candidato. (Preenchimento obrigatório)

- Excelente
 Muito bom
 Bom
 Regular
 Com sérias deficiências

3. Por favor, analise o HISTÓRICO DE PESQUISA DO SUPERVISOR com o qual o candidato desenvolverá o projeto de pesquisa do ponto de vista dos objetivos do projeto.**3.a. Qualidade, regularidade e importância da produção científica e/ou tecnológica, com destaque para a produção recente. Elementos importantes para essa análise são: lista de publicações em periódicos com seletiva política editorial; livros ou capítulos de livros; patentes em que figure como inventor; outros instrumentos de propriedade intelectual; resultados de pesquisa efetivamente transferidos e adotados por empresas ou pelo governo; e outras informações que possam ser relevantes.**

O orientador é referência em sua área de estudos pela importância e frequência de sua produção. É bolsista de produtividade em pesquisa (1B), CNPq; Vigência: 2019-2024. Foi coordenador do Projeto Temático INTERIORIDADE, SUBJETIVIDADE E DISCURSIVIDADE, patrocinado pela Fapesp (2004 - 2008).

3.b. Experiência e competência demonstrada na liderança de projetos de pesquisas relacionados ao tema da proposta em análise.

Foi coordenador do Projeto Temático INTERIORIDADE, SUBJETIVIDADE E DISCURSIVIDADE, patrocinado pela Fapesp (2004 - 2008). Orientou trabalhos de mestrado e doutorado com temática afim, em particular, nos estudos de Wittgenstein, Peirce e Kant.

3.c. Experiência internacional em pesquisa após o doutoramento ou ter demonstrado participação ativa em redes internacionais de colaboração em pesquisa.

Tem publicação de capítulo de livro pela Palgrave Macmillan, Londres, e artigos no periódico Philosophiques, de Montréal.

3.d. Capacidade demonstrada para formar pesquisadores, com destaque para a atividade recente de orientação de estudantes.

A capacidade é atestada pelo número expressivo de orientandos de mestrado e de doutorado, dos quais parte significativa recebeu financiamento Fapesp.

3.e. Resultados obtidos pelo supervisor com financiamentos anteriores da Fapesp.

Foi coordenador do Projeto Temático INTERIORIDADE, SUBJETIVIDADE E DISCURSIVIDADE patrocinado pela Fapesp (2004-2008). Tem um número expressivo de orientandos de mestrado e doutorado, dos quais parte significativa recebeu financiamento Fapesp.

Conclusão sobre a análise do Histórico de Pesquisa do Supervisor. (Preenchimento obrigatório)

- Excelente
 Muito Bom
 Bom
 Regular
 Com sérias deficiências

4. DEFICIÊNCIAS NOTADAS NA PROPOSTA (Se algum dos itens abaixo for assinalado, as razões devem ser explicitadas no quadro correspondente do formulário).

4.a. Sobre o Projeto de Pesquisa, conforme indicado no item 1:

- Projeto com objetivos mal definidos, excessivos ou incongruentes.
 Projeto com objetivos excessivamente limitados.
 Projeto pouco original.
 Contribuição pouco significativa para a área de conhecimento.
 Fundamentação científica insuficiente/metodologia inadequada.
 Inadequado para um programa de Pós-Doutorado.
 Viabilidade de execução questionável.
 Plano de Gestão de Dados inadequado e/ou insuficiente.

4.b. Sobre o Histórico Acadêmico do Candidato, conforme indicado no item 2:

- Produção científica ou tecnológica que não atesta significativo rendimento da atividade de pesquisa.
 Candidato com potencial não evidenciado.
 Formação insuficiente para o projeto proposto.
 A conclusão do doutorado não é recente.

4.c. Sobre o histórico de Pesquisa do Supervisor, conforme indicado no item 3:

- Produção científica ou tecnológica que não atesta significativo rendimento da atividade de pesquisa
 Experiência insuficiente na área de pesquisa em que se insere o projeto, podendo comprometer a sua viabilidade
 Experiência internacional em pesquisa insuficiente após o Doutorado
 Capacidade de orientação não evidenciada
 A produção científica ou tecnológica resultante de auxílios anteriores é insatisfatória

4.d. Outras deficiências. Justificar:

Parecer da 2ª Assessoria

APRECIÇÃO GERAL DA PROPOSTA

A FAPESP denomina "Proposta" o conjunto de três partes a serem avaliadas, composto por: 1. Projeto de Pesquisa; 2. Histórico Acadêmico do Candidato; e 3. Histórico de Pesquisa do Supervisor. Por favor, preencha os itens de análise desta página depois de preencher o restante do formulário.

Projeto de excelência, na fronteira do debate sobre o tema. Candidato com elevado potencial, vindo da UFMG. Supervisor é referência, com trajetória de grande destaque, e amplo histórico na Fapesp.

1. Por favor, analise o PROJETO DE PESQUISA proposto, conforme roteiro abaixo:

1.a. Definição e pertinência dos objetivos.

Projeto bastante competente, bem desenhado, não teria qualquer ressalva. A contribuição pretendida é original, mas sem descuidar dos trabalhos anteriores na área. Em suma, reputo o projeto como de excelência, bastante

adequado a uma pesquisa de PD.

1.b. Originalidade e importância da contribuição pretendida para a área de conhecimento em que o projeto se insere.

A originalidade é evidente, caso os objetivos sejam atingidos. O debate se situa na fronteira do conhecimento.

1.c. Fundamentação científica e os métodos empregados.

O candidato demonstra amplo domínio sobre os conceitos fundamentais, que estão claros e bem definidos. A metodologia é adequada para atingir os objetivos da pesquisa.

1.d. Adequação do projeto a um programa de pós-doutorado.

Plenamente adequado.

1.e. Análise da viabilidade da execução do projeto utilizando a infraestrutura disponível e no prazo previsto.

A infraestrutura disponível na USP é mais do que suficiente para levar a pesquisa a contento.

1.f. O Plano de Gestão de Dados descreve os tipos de dados a serem produzidos pelo projeto, as formas de seu armazenamento, preservação e compartilhamento.

Está dentro do esperado.

Conclusão sobre a análise do Projeto de Pesquisa apresentado. (Preenchimento obrigatório)

- Excelente
 Muito boa
 Boa, com algumas deficiências facilmente sanáveis
 Boa
 Boa com deficiências
 Regular
 Com sérias deficiências

2. Por favor, analise o HISTÓRICO ACADÊMICO DO CANDIDATO seguindo o roteiro abaixo:

2.a. Adequação da formação do candidato ao projeto proposto e da qualidade e regularidade de sua produção como pesquisador, avaliada por publicações em periódicos especializados com seletiva política editorial, livros ou capítulos de livros, patentes em que figura como outros instrumentos de propriedade intelectual; resultados de pesquisa efetivamente transferidos e adotados por empresas ou pelo governo; e outras informações que possam ser relevantes.

Trajetória de excelência, doutor pela UFMG, já tenta as primeiras publicações no campo. A bolsa seria importante para um salto na carreira.

2.b. Analise a experiência internacional em pesquisa do candidato (estágios curtos e longos, participação em colaborações), considerando a qualidade dos resultados publicados.

Doutorado sanduíche na Inglaterra, já tenta se inserir em redes internacionais.

2.c. A FAPESP considera prioritária a concessão de bolsas a candidatos que concluíram recentemente seu doutorado. Não sendo este o caso, analise as circunstâncias especiais que possam justificar a concessão da bolsa solicitada.

É o caso: terminou DR em 2022.

2.d. Outros aspectos julgados relevantes para avaliar seu potencial como pesquisador.

Elevado potencial, jovem doutor.

Conclusão sobre a análise do Histórico Escolar e Acadêmico do Candidato. (Preenchimento obrigatório)

- Excelente
 Muito bom
 Bom
 Regular
 Com sérias deficiências

3. Por favor, analise o HISTÓRICO DE PESQUISA DO SUPERVISOR com o qual o candidato desenvolverá o projeto de pesquisa do ponto de vista dos objetivos do projeto.

3.a. Qualidade, regularidade e importância da produção científica e/ou tecnológica, com destaque para a produção recente. Elementos importantes para essa análise são: lista de publicações em periódicos com seletiva política editorial; livros ou capítulos de livros; patentes em que figure como inventor; outros instrumentos de propriedade intelectual; resultados de pesquisa efetivamente transferidos e adotados por empresas ou pelo governo; e outras informações que possam ser relevantes.

Supervisor possui trajetória de excelência, inclusive junto à FAPESP, que dispensa comentários.

3.b. Experiência e competência demonstrada na liderança de projetos de pesquisas relacionados ao tema da proposta em análise.

Ampla experiência, incluindo projetos financiados pela FAPESP.

3.c. Experiência internacional em pesquisa após o doutoramento ou ter demonstrado participação ativa em redes internacionais de colaboração em pesquisa.

Experiência internacional relevante.

3.d. Capacidade demonstrada para formar pesquisadores, com destaque para a atividade recente de orientação de estudantes.

Já formou grande quantidade de pesquisadores, incluindo muitos doutores e alguns pesquisadores de pós-doutorado, vários deles com financiamento FAPESP, aliás.

3.e. Resultados obtidos pelo supervisor com financiamentos anteriores da Fapesp.

Resultados de excelência, contando também com projetos temáticos.

Conclusão sobre a análise do Histórico de Pesquisa do Supervisor. (Preenchimento obrigatório)

- Excelente
 Muito Bom
 Bom
 Regular
 Com sérias deficiências

4. DEFICIÊNCIAS NOTADAS NA PROPOSTA (Se algum dos itens abaixo for assinalado, as razões devem ser explicitadas no quadro correspondente do formulário).

4.a. Sobre o Projeto de Pesquisa, conforme indicado no item 1:

- Projeto com objetivos mal definidos, excessivos ou incongruentes.
 Projeto com objetivos excessivamente limitados.
 Projeto pouco original.
 Contribuição pouco significativa para a área de conhecimento.
 Fundamentação científica insuficiente/metodologia inadequada.
 Inadequado para um programa de Pós-Doutorado.
 Viabilidade de execução questionável.
 Plano de Gestão de Dados inadequado e/ou insuficiente.

4.b. Sobre o Histórico Acadêmico do Candidato, conforme indicado no item 2:

- Produção científica ou tecnológica que não atesta significativo rendimento da atividade de pesquisa.
 Candidato com potencial não evidenciado.
 Formação insuficiente para o projeto proposto.
 A conclusão do doutorado não é recente.

4.c. Sobre o histórico de Pesquisa do Supervisor, conforme indicado no item 3:

- Produção científica ou tecnológica que não atesta significativo rendimento da atividade de pesquisa
 Experiência insuficiente na área de pesquisa em que se insere o projeto, podendo comprometer a sua viabilidade
 Experiência internacional em pesquisa insuficiente após o Doutorado
 Capacidade de orientação não evidenciada
 A produção científica ou tecnológica resultante de auxílios anteriores é insatisfatória

4.d. Outras deficiências. Justificar:

Frases para Termo de Outorga

Não há frases associadas.

 Carregando...