RAFAEL TERUEL COELHO

The aim of this research is to investigate Elisabeth of Bohemia's conception of soul in the light of her correspondence with Descartes. In her first letters to the philosopher, Elisabeth argues as follows: contrary to what Descartes defended, the soul would need to have a kind of "essential extensive function" that could enable its interaction with the body. She believed that, only in this way, the spirit could determine voluntary actions. This need to "materialize" the soul, although it seems not to culminate in a strict materialism, can be characterized as a kind of "non-reductive materialism". However, even if Elisabeth does not reduce the spirit to simple bodily movements, her view still seems to distance itself from the Cartesian ontological proposal, especially since Descartes never abdicated his dualism in the face of the thesis of substantial union. Given this, our central hypotheses point in the following directions: I) Elisabeth's "nuanced" materialism develops as a reaction to Cartesian dualism; II) it is based on the mechanistic perspective; III) it is constituted from the writings of the philosopher's main objectors.