VICTOR GONÇALVES DE SOUSA

This work intends to offer a reconstruction of Aristotle's position on the role of reason in the determination of the ends of action that conciliates both the thesis according to which agents who are neither virtuous nor vicious can aim at morally good ends and the thesis according to which virtue makes the end right, explaining in this way how would it be possible to have a morally good end in view without it being a right end. In general, the reconstructions of Aristotle's position on this question either reform one of these two theses or else commit themselves to a reading of Aristotle's practical philosophy that either does not take a stance on the exact nature of the relation between reason and desire or else, when speaking about this relation, assumes a controversial position on hylomorphism.In order to avoid these difficulties, I come up with another alternative, which seems not only to preserve the two theses that were mentioned, but also to explain clearly and without depending on the subscription to a strong version of hylomorphism in which way the morally good end that non virtuous agents may eventually aim at does not consist in the correct end.