LUCAS RAFAEL GONÇALVES FERREIRA

Reproducibility is considered one of the foundations of the epistemic authority of science. However, in recent years, significant studies in the scientific literature of the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences have systematically failed in multiple attempts at experimental replication, casting doubt on the reliability of substantial parts of scientific knowledge, thus leading to the so-called reproducibility crisis. One of the responses to this crisis has been the emergence of metascience. This work conducts a philosophical and descriptive analysis of this discipline. Building on the post-Kuhnian concept of 'research repertoires' proposed by Ankeny & Leonelli, metascience is conceived as a repertoire of experimental practices aimed at testing meta-hypotheses about sets of first-order epistemic activities, guided by the ideal of experimental reproducibility. In this context, we propose the philosophy of metascience and present some of its philosophical problems. We define the concept of meta-hypothesis and its relationship with first-order epistemic activities