RAFAEL TERUEL COELHO

The aim of this research is to investigate Elisabeth of Bohemia’s conception of the soul in light of her correspondence with Descartes, following the interpretative line of Lisa Shapiro (1999). In her first letters to the philosopher, Elisabeth argues as follows: unlike what Descartes defended, the soul would need to possess a kind of “essential extended function” that could enable its interaction with the body. She believed that only in this way could the spirit determine voluntary actions. This need to “materialize” the soul, although it does not seem to culminate in absolute materialism, is characterized by Shapiro as a non-reductionist materialist perspective. However, even if Elisabeth does not reduce the spirit to the body, her view still seems to distance itself from the Cartesian ontological proposal, especially because Descartes never gave up his dualism in the face of the thesis of substantial union.