JOÃO VITOR FERRARI RABELO

The research aims to explore strategies to counter the problem of trivialization raised against structuralism as a framework for the analysis of science. First articulated by M. H. Newman, the problem indicates that structuralist accounts of scientific knowledge are either false or reducible to mere cardinality claims. Rendering knowledge highly trivial, this challenge proved devastating for early structuralist programs, such as Russell’s Analysis of Matter and Carnap’s Aufbau—works that serve as the starting point of this investigation. As structuralism gained prominence in the contemporary debate, the objection has reemerged in the last decades, now articulated with greater formal precision. It remains an open question whether structuralism can effectively respond to it, and whether any adequate response must involve concessions that undermine structuralism’s potential. The main goal of this study is to save scientific structuralism from trivialization and, if possible, to seek a solution that avoids committing to an excessively restrictive notion of scientific structure.