JOAO FELIPE SANTANA RASI

One of the most heated debates in the philosophy of mind is the hard problem of consciousness, formulated by Chalmers (1996). This problem involves explaining how subjective mental experiences arise from biochemical and physical processes in the brain. The central issue in this discussion is the nature of phenomenal consciousness. Various theories attempt to provide an understanding of the nature of mentality, such as functionalism and panpsychism. The functionalist theory posits that a mental state is a functional state, defined by the relations between sensory inputs, intermediate/mental states, and behavioral outputs. In contrast, panpsychism asserts that mentality is present throughout reality, with some versions claiming that mental states arise from the intrinsic properties of fundamental entities. Therefore, the aim of the project is to analyze and reconsider, through functionalism, certain theoretical aspects of panpsychism, particularly the panprotopsychist version. We suspect that this analysis may offer new perspectives for panpsychism to address some of the issues in its theory.