In Spinoza's philosophy, the divine participation in reality is constructed as an immanent efficient cause. Therefore, the relationship between God and singular things for Spinoza is based on immanence, dislocating itself from theological conceptions of divine transcendence. Thus, Spinoza has to prove that the substance is unique and unified, allowing to classify the modal essence of human beings as pars Dei. However, we must ask: how was Spinoza capable to reject any aspect of transcendence in God and affirm pure immanence? In order to answer this question, the present research intends to analyze the elements that are synthetically mobilized within the geometric course of immanence (mainly, definition 6, and propositions 11, 14, 15, and 16 of Ethics I), to investigate the absolute affirmative activity of God under the hypotheses of a radical or mild immanence.
YONAH AKERMAN ZIMERMAN
Course
Master's degree
Research title
THE DIVINE IMMANENCE IN SPINOZA'S ETHICS
Research abstract
Graduate Advisor
Luís César Guimarães Oliva