ÁLVARO ITIE FEBRÔNIO NONAKA

The present research aims to conduct an analysis of The Imaginary: Phenomenological Psychology of Imagination, seeking to understand how the issue of the image is presented in Sartre's philosophy and exploring the connections between imagination and
freedom. The dissertation is grounded in the critical results of "The Imagination," meaning from a new theory of the image. In this theory, the image loses its status as a copy or simulacrum of the thing present in the mind, which was linked to the classical conception, and transforms into a special type of consciousness due to Husserlian intentionality. Thus, the central questions guiding our research are: How can we understand that imagination, capable of inducing a state of non-freedom or alienation, manages to produce freedom? From Sartre's early works, how is the problem of imagination constituted? If Sartre identifies the nature of the image with intentional consciousness and rejects the role of perception in its constitution, what are the conditions for a consciousness to imagine? What does it mean to characterize human freedom by the possibility of consciousness forming images?