FERNANDO DEL POZZO GRACIANO DE SOUZA

The main objective of the research is to seek a definition of the concept of ‘haecceitas’ introduced in the history of philosophy by João Duns Escoto. With this, we hope to elucidate how the possibility of a 'formal but not real distinction' placed at the center of the debate on the individuation of beings occurs. According to Duns Escoto, essence and existence are united in such a way that the updating of form is no more necessary than ‘haecceitas’. This does not mean that there is, in this process, individuation through the formation of a compound, and that neither matter nor form is the cause of individuation. It follows that the principle of individuation, that is, ‘haecceitas’, is in the first place something positive and also that which is most characteristic of the being that determines it. To do so, we will follow Duns Scotus' argument set out in his Ordinatio II, dist. 3, pars 1, where the author confronts contemporary theories and exposes his own position on individuation. Furthermore, we propose to look at his Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, libri VII and Reportata Parisiensia II, dist. 12, pars 5, where the author coins the term ‘haecceitas’.