Artur Farias Batista

The object of our research lies in a problem not classical to Husserl’s philosophy, language, as treated in the work with which phenomenology began, LU. While LU1 deals with the structure of meaning, the book’s defining project is epistemological: it seeks to clarify the foundations of science on the basis of a pure logic. Still, the originality in Husserl’s theory of expression, as well as its position in the principles of phenomenology, invite for a more careful study. And in it there can be found two ends of a tension that would be decisive for the philosophy of language: on the one hand, meaning as the act or intentional experience of a psychic subject, and on the other, meaning as the identical species which confers each expression with its objective unity. The question for the essence of expression drives us then to the enigma of how reality and ideality correlate in the meaning activity. If Husserl’s position on the issue of expression changed substancially in the course of his ouvre, our focus will be in elucidating its starting point—which would culminate in the idea of a pure grammar—aiming to bring to light this original thought as it initiated its movement.