PAULO DUARE ANDRADE SAYEG

A project of growing interest in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science is seeking to reconcile Enactivism with Active Inference. Several premises, theses and concepts from each perspective need to be articulated to form a coherent reconciliation. This research project proposes to analyze the possibilities of reconciling the concept of mental representation, used in Active Inference, with Enactivism. From this analysis, it is possible to raise potential problems in the search for conciliation if the mental representation in Active Inference is incompatible with Enactivism or, if they are compatible, to clarify what steps must be taken to achieve these searches. Therefore, the question of this project is the following: is it possible to reconcile the concept of mental representation present in Active Inference with enactivist principles? We have the general objectives of explaining the premises of both perspectives and evaluating whether there is any incompatibility in principle between mental representations in Active Inference and enactivist premises.