CASSY JONES FELIPE CARDOSO DA SILVA

The present research connects Kant's critique of metaphysics by investigating how it redefines objective knowledge, restricting it to possible experience, in accordance with the Copernican revolution, which subordinated objective conditions to the sensible and intellectual rules of representation. The assignment of specific rules to sensibility breaks the identity between being and thinking, which was fundamental to Schulmetaphysik. Thought operates through analytical criteria, but knowledge requires synthetic conditions linked to experience. Thus, the categories of understanding, as ontological concepts, depend on sensibility to acquire content; without it, they remain general logical forms. Metaphysics, as the science of the principles of knowledge, recognizes that analytical criteria are negative conditions, while logical possibility requires sensibility for its realization. Two corrections emerge: the substitution of being as being with the supreme concept of the "object in general"; and the recognition that any object is knowable only through sensible rules. This inaugurates a conceptual space where the non-contradictory and the unrepresentable acquire philosophical relevance.