PAULO DUARE ANDRADE SAYEG

The aim is to evaluate whether the concept of mental representation derived from the notion of active inference is consistent with enactivist philosophy of nature. We work with the following definition of active inference: an inductive and statistical inference that uses prediction error minimization as its criterion for induction and employs not only a model of the causes of observations but also a model of an agent's motor system. The enactivist philosophy of nature has been positively characterized in this study, given the lack of consensus in the literature regarding its status. We are now assessing the implicit conceptual 1 framework of both this philosophy and active inference to determine whether inconsistencies might arise in the case of a synthesis or integration between active inference and the enactivist philosophy of nature. The qualification exam has already been completed. Additionally, we presented a paper at the Brazilian International Cognitive Science Event (EBICC) exploring the hypothesis of representational continuity, a topic relevant to the master's research.