RICARDO GARCEZ

The aim of this research is to compare the conceptions of scientific neutrality in Hugh Lacey and Hilton Japiassu. In some sense, both deny that science is neutral, but the definition of neutrality, its denial and the implications of this denial are different for each author. On the one hand, Japiassu seems to belong to a group influenced by post-modern thinking and constructivism, which tends to accept a certain relativism and attenuate the concept of truth. On the other hand, Lacey exemplifies the attempt to elucidate how science works through the role of cognitive and social values at different stages of scientific work. In order to compare the positions of the two authors, we will use Oliveira's definitions of neutrality separated into three thematic axes: neutrality based on the fact/value dichotomy, with Hume, Putnam and Mariconda; ethical neutrality, and neutrality of application, with Ellul; and neutrality as objectivity, with Weber. After a more general grounding, we will be able to analyse the position of Lacey and Japiassu. In doing so, we hope to contribute to the qualification of the debate on scientific neutrality, as well as to the commentary on the works of the two