According to Jaeger, Aristotle was responsible, After Plato, for a split between theory and practice that would later culminate in a progressive praise of active life in antiquity. Aubenque, although suspicious of the movement proposed by Jaeger, also acknowledged this rupture and, by devoting himself to the study of phronesis, clarified the metaphysical reasons why the Stagirite needed to recognise not a theoretical knowledge but a virtue to guide men in the human world as it is. It was then pointed out how human action moves in the realm of the contingent, that is, in the realm of what can be different from what is, while science concerns itself with the necessary, ignoring the world of becoming. However, not only do Aristotle's ethical, economic and political treatises attest to the possibility of scientific knowledge of human affairs, but he himself, in his classification of sciences, conceptualised some of them as practical, in addition to the productive and theoretical ones. Our aim, then, is to investigate how this universe of chance and particularity that constitutes practice can be adapted to the necessity and universality required by science.
GIÁCOMO FIORITTI LEANDRO
Course
Doctorate Degree
Research title
Necessity, contingency and the possibilities for a practical science in Aristotle
Research abstract
Graduate Advisor
Patricio Tierno
Lattes (curriculum vitae)