Cassy Jones Felipe Cardoso da Silva

This work consists of an exercise in interpretation of the problem of the relation between logic and metaphysics in Kant's theoretical philosophy. It is about understanding how the science of the necessary laws of thought in general and the science of the a priori knowledge are linked. As we know, Kant conceives logic as autonomous science, not being able to borrow principles of other sciences. However, interpreters such as Jules Vuillemin, Jean Cavaillès and Béatrice Longuenesse insist on the necessary interference of principles provided for by other sciences in the context of formal logic. Based on the methodological distinction between, on the one hand, logical and metaphysical areas of investigation and, on the other hand, logical and metaphysical definitions of the faculties of cognition, this work is divided into two parts of two chapters each. The first part is intended for the study of sensibility. The first chapter investigates the structure of intuitive cognition and its relation with the notion of logical form. In the second chapter, we outline the study of the structure of sensibility as faculty of receptivity, considering the properly metaphysical scope of its investigation, the forms of sensibility. The second part is intended for the study of understanding. In the third chapter, we seek to elucidate the structure of discursive or conceptual cognition according to its various nomenclatures, and then we investigate its relations within the logical form. In the fourth chapter, we discuss the problem of the relation between logic and metaphysics in the metaphysical deduction of pure concepts of understanding, in an attempt to link the distinct scopes of research into a coherent whole. Finally, the conclusion gives some indications about what could be called critical reform of metaphysics.