BETÂNIA DA SILVA MARQUES

he objects of this dissertation are the conception of Bertrand Russell's Theory of Judgment between 1905 and 1921, as well as the transformation that his theory underwent in this same period, seeking to (re)create the central points of the initial theory, the problems arising from it and the different ways in which Russell tried to solve them. Russell's change from dualism to a kind of neutral monism is public knowledge, as is his approach to psychologism, but it is not always clear what the reasons were that led him to this point, mainly his approach and break with behaviorism. Another objective of the work is to try to demonstrate that Russell did not definitively break with his previous ideas, but tried to reconcile them, to the extent that he found solutions to the open problems. With these objectives in mind, the dissertation proposes, first, to present a historical context of the works from 1905 to 1921. Then, we will analyze the key work of psychological change, namely, Analysis of Mind (1921) and, finally, a general overview of Russell's analyses and breaks with the theory of behaviorism.