As regards Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Z (or VII) is widely recognized as central and the most challenging. Among its chapters, the tenth and eleventh are the most extensive, discussing what the definition of sensible entities is composed of and what ontological relationships are reflected on it. With special emphasis, Z 10-11 investigates whether matter can integrate definitions, and, correspondingly, whether it enjoys ontological precedence over the compounds it constitutes. Interpretations that conclude with a negative answer tend to rely mainly on Z 10, which highlights an intimate association between definition and form (εἶδος), and even an equivalence between εἶδος, essence (οὐσία) and quiddity (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι). Indeed, if this chapter is decisive for Book VII, it is for revisiting the promising candidacy of quiddity to the post of essence, after the excursus of Z 7-9. The relevance of Z 10 as a unit of reflection is thickened by the multiplicity of issues on which it pronounces – to some, even, providing the canonical Aristotelian formulation. Among them, stand out the indefinability of individuals; the classification of species as universal compounds; the interdiction, to these, of the status of οὐσία; the “unknowability” of matter; the identity of each thing with its essence. The chapter’s interest is heightened by the difficulty of clarifying how these topics are related, and why they matter to the argument. Furthermore, in the course of the text, enigmatic or thorny expressions are used, such as the one that mentions a matter to which the entity “supervenes” (ἐπιγίγνεται), the one that designates entities συνειλημμένα (literally, “taken together”) to matter, the one that points out that it is “either all or some” (ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια) of the parts of the essence what exerts anteriority, the one naming the compound substance as “the compound from the form” (τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους, instead of “... from form and matter”). This dissertation proposes, as a reading capable of clarifying and harmonizing the various points of difficulty, one that identifies the allegedly rejected thesis: that of the presence of matter in the definition, and its relative ontological priority, vis-à-vis sensible entities. A key point is to detect the tacit characterization (evidenced as the two halves of the chapter approach their themes, that of the parts of the λόγος and that of anteriority) according to which being a part of the form is the originary way of constituting the thing – which “no longer” (οὐκέτι, 1035a21) obtains when what is in case is the “already” (ἤδη, a16, b31, 1036a2) individual matter, but from which not every matter is excluded (1035a5-6): so much so that compounds are composed “from the form”, simpliciter; the direct realization of form is its concretization as compound. This is a line-by-line commentary, but it is also attentive to the correspondences in the corpus, to the (plentiful) interpretive literature and to the main theoretical developments. It is expected that, at the end of the work, a favorable perspective shall emerge for a compatibility between the contemporary tendency to claim ontological dignity for the contingent and the classical subordination of sensitive reality to some universals.
Keywords: Aristotelism. Metaphysics. Ontology. Matter (Philosophy). Form (Philosophy). Essence (Philosophy). Substance (Philosophy).