This doctoral dissertation studies Carnap’s metaontology. Certain theses put forward by Quine (linked to his criterion of ontological commitment) are discussed and examined, as well as Carnap’s response to them in his main metaontological work, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”. The fundamental elements of Carnap’s metaontology are discerned, and their origins are traced back to his earlier works. The main thesis argued here is that Quine and Carnap hold radically dierent conceptions about what it is to endorse an ontological doctrine—such as nominalism and Platonism—and about what should ground the adoption or rejection of dierent theories and languages in scientific and philosophical disciplines. It is also argued in preliminary form that certain indirect results for ontology as a discipline emerge from Carnap’s response to Quine. Lastly, some relevant dierences between Carnap’s doctrine and those held neo-Carnapians are brought to light, as well as some equally relevant similarities between Carnap’s doctrine and neo-Quinenanism.
Keywords: Carnap, Metaontology, Nominalism, Ontology, Ontological Commitment, Platonism, Quine