Deciding whether the passion for fame, also referred to as the love of a good reputation, is a vice or a virtue is a problem that has preoccupied many philosophers since classical antiquity. While for some, the love of fame is equivalent to a desire that is detrimental to the dignity of the individual and to the advancement of society, for others it is the best way to achieve personal and social progress. This thesis seeks to demonstrate how, after much speculation by philosophers, the Scotsman David Hume offers, in our view, an unassailable solution to the impasse. To do so, we start from the premise that the problem of reputation occupies a central place in his philosophy. This centrality, articulated in the sphere of psychology (his system of passions), acquires a role of great influence also in the fields of morality and politics. This study will attempt to identify this influence by examining the concept of justice elaborated by Hume in his seminal work A Treatise of Human Nature. Taking into consideration an analysis of the system of passions, developed by the philosopher in this same work - our first objective is to identify and understand what this says about the specific passion, the love of a good reputation. Furthermore, it will reveal what are the developments that stem from this passion and how they enable us to better understand Hume’s thoughts on justice and political society at large. Some of the ramifications of this inquiry are also presented along the way, such as Hume’s break with the rationalist tradition and his proposal for a new understanding of the conflict between passions and reason, and how his work also allows us to consider the love of fame and matters of reputation or vanity not as vices or principles of conflict, but, on the contrary, as fundamental to sociability and political authority via opinions instead of legal or rational precepts. The main argument of this work is the assertion that David Hume’s philosophy is a turning point in philosophical tradition regarding the love of fame. This is true because Hume asks us not to view it only within the spheres of military, religious, artistic or political glory, but instead consider it to also be the center of common life. In doing so, it allows us to consider it as one of the most important passions of all, if not the most important, since it is, along with benevolence, a prevailing passion of sociability, responsible for the natural possibility of gregarious life. We can then conclude that without this sentiment, man would be prevented from acquiring the virtue of justice, which is in fact the great “support of society” with regard to both its foundation and its development. For our research, we chose as a primary source Book 2 (Of the Passions) from A Treatise on Human Nature (1939-1940), while using Book 1 (Of the Understanding) as a reference, which precedes it, and Book 3 (Of Morals), which follows it. As complementary sources, all of Hume's work was taken into account, particularly An Inquiry into the Principles of Morals and the essay Of the First Principles of Government. In establishing the argument that fame is the principal social component of the human system of passions we also considered a series of rare and recent articles on this specific theme within the vast and increasingly prolific academic and public production of the work and biography of our author.
Keywords: Reputation; Fame; Merit, Character; Passions.