TALES RODRIGUES NORONHA SILVA

The present dissertation aims to provide an interpretation of Wittgenstein's mature thoughts on intentionality—the "directionality" of mental states and linguistic expressions—as found in the Philosophical Investigations, the philosopher's main work of maturity. This involves a deeper engagement with sections §428 to §465 of the same book, where Wittgenstein makes his most explicit considerations on intentionality. However, to better understand these observations, we also need to present how the philosopher thought about the topic during the time of the Tractatus, since much of his mature thought refers back to theses from his early period. If previously the philosopher considered that intentionality consisted in an essential relationship between proposition, thought, and reality, later he sees it as a relationship that obtains in language itself. We also seek to elucidate the observations on rules, understanding, and meaning something [meinen] in the Investigations, as these themes are closely related to the problems of intentionality. In the same way as a thought seems to hold an essential relationship with a state of affairs "outside" it, a rule seems to hold an essential relationship with its instances of correct application: in both cases, we have a link between what is present here and now, and something not immediately present. Understanding and meaning undergo similar problems, as they seem capable of containing both the intentionality of speech and of rules. Finally, we attempt to reconstruct in general terms the evolution of thoughts on intentionality during Wittgenstein's intermediate period. Thus, we hope to obtain a general overview of the issues regarding intentionality in the Philosophical Investigations.